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Over the last decades, there has been a marked increase in the interest in prediction
and betting markets. This interest was driven by their demonstrated capacity to ag-
gregate information and to improve on the more traditional forecasting methods. In
the rst chapter, we analyze key dierences between prediction and betting markets
and make conjectures about the eect of these dierent characteristics on markets'
performance. In the second chapter, we replicate the betting market experiment,
cited in Plott, Wit & Yang (2003), to analyze the process of information aggregation.
Based on observed market odds, Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) show that information
was aggregated on their market. On the other hand, model based only on the use of
private information ts traders' behavior best. In contrast to aggregate level data
analysis employed in Plott, Wit & Yang (2003), we analyze individual level data
and explain these paradoxical results. Finally, we conducted a CERGE-EI inter-
nal prediction market to take a well-known and experimentally tested information
aggregation mechanism and implement it in a real institution for internal use to
examine if it could work in this particular setting. In the third chapter, we report
on the results of this market and we show that for the performance of the market,
design and implementation details matter greatly, especially in the case of internal
small scale prediction markets.
Abstrakt
V posledních desetiletích do²lo k výraznému nárustu zájmu o predik£ní a sázkové
trhy (prediction and betting markets). Tento zájem byl vyvolán zejména je-
jich prokázaným potenciálem agregovat informace a schopností zp°esnit vyuºívané
predik£ní metody. V první kapitole této dizerta£ní práce analyzujeme hlavní rozdíly
mezi predik£ními a sázkovými trhy, p°i£emº vyslovujeme domn¥nky o vlivu t¥chto
rozdíl· na výkonnost trh·. V druhé kapitole se zam¥°ujeme na proces agregace
informací pomocí replikace experimentálního sázkového trhu uvedeného v publikaci
Plott, Wit & Yang (2003). Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) prost°ednictvím kurz· na
jejich sázkovem trhu ukazují, ºe informace byly agregovány. Paradoxem je, ºe model
zaloºený pouze na pouºívání soukromých informací vystihuje chování jednotlivých
obchodník· nejlépe. Na rozdíl od analýzy agregátních dat, kterou zvolili Plott,
Wit & Yang (2003), my analyzujeme data na úrovni jednotlivých obchodník· a
vysv¥tlujeme tento paradox. V poslední kapitole uvádíme výsledky na²eho interního
predik£ního trhu zorganizovaného na institutu CERGE-EI. Tento trh nám umoºnil
testovt známý, experimentáln¥ ov¥°ený mechanismus pro reálné vnit°ní pot°eby této
instituce. V rámci tohoto experimentu jsme poukázali na fakt, ºe design a imple-
mentace predik£ního trhu jsou nesmírn¥ d·leºité pro jeho správné fungování a to





The trustworthiness of popular judgements and the reliability of collective decision mak-
ing have been of substantial interest for a long time. A hundred years ago, British scientist
Francis Galton attended a weight judging competition at Plymouth. Almost eight hun-
dred townspeople estimated the weight of an ox. Some of the participants were experts at
judging the weight of livestock (butchers, farmers) while others were guided only by their
fancies with no insider knowledge of cattle. Surprisingly enough for Galton, the mean
estimate, which can be interpreted as the collective wisdom of the Plymouth crowd, was
pretty accurate.
Galton's experience suggests that under some circumstances, groups are remarkably
intelligent and even smarter than the smartest people in them. Galton saw much more
in this competition than just popular entertainment. He points out that the average
competitor is probably as well suited for making a just estimation of the ox, as "an
average voter is of judging the merits of most political issues on which he votes" (Galton
1907, p.450); could we continue "as an average employee of estimating the level of sales"
or "as an average citizen of predicting the success of a certain public policy"?
Consider a rm that is about to make a signicant investment in the launching of
a new product on the market or a risk-manager whose long term trades are based on
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the forecasts of macroeconomic indicators. In these scenarios a high accuracy of fore-
casts is of the utmost importance. Predicting the outcome of uncertain events like sales
forecasts, macroeconomic indicators, political or sporting events clearly requires that we
have relevant and sucient information with which to make our prediction as accurate
as possible. Yet, as Hayek (1945) (p.519) puts it, "the knowledge of the circumstances
of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely
as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess."
The rst experimental evidence of a markets'ability to coordinate information to reveal
an equilibrium competitive price can be found, for example, in Smith (1962), and studies
explicitly designed to analyze the ability of dierent market mechanisms to aggregate
information include, for example, Plott and Sunder (1982) or Plott and Sunder (1988).
Over the last decades, there has been a marked increase in the interest in continuous
double auction markets and call markets (prediction markets) and parimutuel and xed-
odds betting systems (betting markets). This interest was driven by their demonstrated
capacity in some settings to aggregate information and to improve on the more traditional
forecasting and decision-making methods.
In this experimental dissertation, we focus on the process of information aggregation
in prediction and betting markets, which is well documented (Plott, Wit, and Yang
2003) but not so well understood (Plott, Wit, and Yang 2003; Roust and Plott 2005;
Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Rietz 2008). We developed software for our experiments
and conducted three experimental markets. We analyze data from these experiments and
together with summarizing and classifying key features of both prediction and betting
markets, we try to shed some light on why prediction and betting markets are successful
and how various design and implementation features aect their performance.
Chapter 1: Prediction vs Betting Markets. The results from both prediction and
betting markets are mixed. While there is extensive evidence that these markets provide
unbiased estimates in various settings (e.g. Debnath 2003 or Berg et al. 2008), there are
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also known cases of not-so-successful markets (e.g. Berlemann, Dimitrova, and Nenovsky
2006 or Jacobsen, Potters, Schram, van Winden, and Wit 2000). These mixed results
together with our internal prediction market project (reported in the nal chapter) led
to a review of the key characteristics of prediction and betting markets presented in the
opening chapter of this dissertation.
The hope was to provide some guidelines for a proper choice of a market mechanism
depending on the particular application. We observe that prediction markets are exten-
sively used in many dierent areas while the use of betting systems is concentrated on
the predicting outcomes of sport events.
We conjecture that this is due to several advantages of prediction markets over betting
markets. In particular, prediction markets are more ecient and exible and hence, for
most purposes, a more suitable information aggregation mechanism compared to simple
but rather rigid betting markets.
Chapter 2: Understanding the Plott-Wit-Yang Paradox. The main focus of this
chapter is on the process of information aggregation in prediction and betting markets. In
particular, in the second chapter of the dissertation, we report the results of a parimutuel
betting market based on Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003). We focus on traders' behavior
in terms of acting on private signals versus updating one's beliefs based on observed
behavior of other participants.
We nd extensive support for our hypothesis that participants in our betting market
learn from other participants and form a weighted average of their private signal and
of the market's public signal. In the early stages of our experiment, participants tend
to trust their private signals more. However, as the experiment progresses, participants
learn that the public signal is more informative and increase the weight put on this source
of information.
Chapter 3: A Prediction Market for Applications. In the third chapter, we test the
aggregation of information in a specic setting. We conducted two internal experimental
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prediction markets at CERGE-EI, Prague, to forecast the number of applications received
for the 2009/2010 Ph.D. program. The results of this project are promising.
While we found certain ineciencies (the sum of prices is greater than one, not winning
events are overpriced), overall our short-term prediction market worked very well. The
success of our long-term prediction market was not so overwhelming, but we conjecture
that the rather poor performance can be explained by the incentive system used.
Our experimental markets show that while prediction markets have the potential to
serve as a decision making tool, we have to be careful about their design and implemen-
tation especially in the case of internal, small-scale prediction markets.
6
Chapter 1
Prediction vs Betting Markets1
1.1 Introduction
The popularity of prediction and betting markets has increased signicantly over recent
years. This interest was driven by their ability to aggregate information and to increase
the accuracy of predictions compared to more traditional methods. In order to make our
prediction as accurate as possible, we need to have all relevant information which is usually
possessed by a large number of individuals and rather dicult to gather. Prediction and
betting markets seem to have a potential to aggregate all the information available and
therefore help make reliable predictions of various uncertain events: be it political or
sporting events, sales forecasts, or macroeconomic indicators.
The terms prediction and betting markets are often used to describe several dierent
market mechanisms. The most common2 are the:
• pari-mutuel betting market
• xed-odds betting markets
• continuous double auction (prediction market)
• call market (prediction market)
1All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
2This list of market mechanisms is not complete, we only mention the most wide-spread types of
market. There are other possibilities, such as point spreads oered by bookmakers. However, these
types are not relevant for the purpose of this chapter.
7
In this chapter, we analyze two types of markets: the pari-mutuel betting market and
the call market. There are two reasons for this choice.
The rst and the main reason comes from the objective of this dissertation. In all
its chapters, we concentrate on internal prediction markets used within corporations or
non-prot institutions. These markets are usually small and organized to acquire the
prediction of the event of interest (e.g. the end date of a project, level of sales, etc.)
rather than to make a monetary prot. It might be the case, that the market organizer
either does not have sucient information to set reasonable market odds, or he does not
want to set market odds and inuence traders by suggesting what the "correct" odds are
(as needed in xed-odds betting markets often used in sports).
Further, a small number of participants usually leads to a relatively low level of activity
on the market. If the market is open continuously (like in a continuous double auction
market), participants might be discouraged by a low activity throughout the day and lose
interest in participation.
Therefore the likely candidates for an internal prediction market are a:
• call market, where limit orders are matched and the market cleared once or twice a
day
• pari-mutuel betting market, where the market odds are not set by the market maker
but result from the wagering of all traders
The second reason for choosing the pari-mutuel betting market and the call market is
the fact that in this experimental dissertation, we report the results from two experiments
that we conducted. The rst experimental market was organized as a pari-mutuel betting
market (inspired by Plott, Wit, and Yang 2003) and is analyzed in the second chapter
of this dissertation. The second experiment was a call market organized at CERGE-EI,
Prague and is described in the third chapter. After conducting these two experiments,
natural questions arose: What are the major dierences between these two markets,
and how do their key characteristics aect their performance? Is one mechanism more
appropriate than the other (in some situations)?
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To our best knowledge, there is no research which would provide suggestions for the
proper choice of a market mechanism. This chapter therefore tries to ll this void. We list
and analyze the key characteristics of both types of markets and make conjectures about
the eect of these key characteristics on their performance. Our analysis is mostly based
on existing experimental and theoretical literature. In other words, we try to summarize
the known facts about both types of markets and discuss both their advantages and
drawbacks. We also provide several conjectures which are based on our experience and
the results of experimental markets discussed in chapters 2 and 3. This chapter may be
found useful by experimenters before they make a decision about market mechanisms.
1.2 Denition and Examples
In this section, we explain how both a pari-mutuel betting market and a call market
work, and we provide some examples of areas where these markets are typically used. In
order to make our arguments and conjectures more general, for the remaining part of this
chapter we will talk about prediction and betting markets in general. Most of the key
characteristics that we will mention hold for all types of prediction markets (continuous
double auction and call markets) or betting markets (xed-odds and pari-mutuel betting
markets). If this is not the case, we will make an explicit note about their dierences.
1.2.1 Prediction Markets
A continuous double auction is a type of a prediction market, where potential buyers
submit their bids and potential sellers simultaneously submit their ask prices to an auc-
tioneer, and then an auctioneer chooses a price p that clears the market: all the sellers
who asked less than p sell and all buyers who bid more than p buy at this price p.
A call market is a market in which trading in individual securities occurs at specic
times as opposed to continuously. In a call market, all orders to buy and sell a particular
security are assembled at one time in order to determine a price at which most of the
orders can be executed. Call markets are frequently used in situations in which there are
9
few securities and participants. Because the call market groups transactions together,
there is a substantial increase in liquidity.
The sole dierence between a continuous double auction (used for example in Berg,
Nelson, and Rietz 2003) and a call market (for example the CERGE-EI internal prediction
market analyzed in chapter 3) is the way of matching bids (oers to buy an asset for at
most a given price) and asks (oer to sell for at least a given price). In the continuous
double auction market, bids and asks are matched continuously. Moreover, best current
bids and asks are listed and can be accepted by traders immediately. In a call market,
limit orders are made privately by traders and with a pre-determined frequency, these
orders are matched and trades are made (if bid prices exceed ask prices).
Examples of prediction markets include, for instance, the famous Iowa Electronic
Market, which has been used to predict the results of American presidential elections
since 1988. In this market, participants can trade with the assets that pay $1 if the next
president is a Democrat and $0 otherwise. The market price of this asset, for example 80
cents, is then interpreted as 80% probability that the next president will be a Democrat.
Similarly, participants can trade with assets whose payo is tied to the next president
being a Republican. In this particular Iowa Electronic market, participants can trade with
two mentioned assets. In general, there can be multiple assets on the market, and they
are chosen in such a way that they cover all possible outcomes of a predicted uncertain
future event.
The Iowa Electronic market is analyzed by Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, and Rietz (2008)
who summarize a dozen years of election futures markets research and nd that the
election-eve market forecasts generally predict better than do the major national polls.
Berg, Nelson, and Rietz (2003) point out that there has been no analysis of prediction
markets' long run predictive power, and they are the rst to show that markets are
generally much better predictors than are polls months before the elections.
Further examples of political prediction markets include, for example Jacobsen, Pot-
ters, Schram, van Winden, and Wit (2000) who report the results of their political pre-
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diction market in the Netherlands. The authors nd that their markets were not as
accurate as the Iowa prediction markets. Despite quite a large interest and a high num-
ber of traders, their markets failed to outperform the national polls. Another example is
the rst experimental market in the Czech Republic designed to predict the outcome of
parliamentary elections in 2002 (see Cahlík, Ger²l, Hlavá£ek, and Berlemann 2005).
Apart from being employed in predicting the outcomes of political events, prediction
markets appear to be useful decision-making tools for corporations. Hewlett-Packard, for
example, pioneered applications to sales forecasting and, due to their success, has since
integrated prediction markets in several business units (Chen and Plott 2002).
The experimental prediction market created at Siemens, which aimed to estimate the
expected delay in completing a certain project, showed satisfying forecasting potential
(results are summarized in Ortner 1997 and Ortner 1998). Such cases suggest that pre-
diction markets used in corporate level decision-making processes, e.g. as an indicator of
the probability of the success of a project, indeed show promise.
Apart from probably the most well-known Iowa Electronic Market for predicting elec-
tion outcomes, other examples are mostly web-based markets with the possibility to bet
on sports, entertainment, or economic indicators and their turnover ranges in hundreds
of thousands to millions of dollars (for example intrade.com).
1.2.2 Betting Markets
The second type of a market, a pari-mutuel betting market, or simply a betting
market, as typically used in horse racing and other sports events, is based on a betting
system in which all bets are put together and the payo (odds) is determined by dividing
the total amount of money invested by the amount betted on the winning horse.3
Pari-mutuel betting diers from xed-odds betting in that the nal payout is not
determined until the pool is closed. In xed-odds betting, the payout is agreed at the
time the bet is sold. Odds can change during the existence of a betting market  for
3The amount of money available for a distribution to the winners is usually lowered by the house
charge.
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example, if a market maker realizes that he missed some important fact and needs to
readjust the odds  but for the traders, only the odds under which they place a bet
matter.
In this chapter, the use of "betting markets" refers to pari-mutuel betting systems
because we concentrate on small-scale, internal prediction markets. On these internal
markets, there is no market maker who would set the market odds. On the contrary, the
hope is to use this mechanism to aggregate dispersed pieces of information and nd out
what the proper odds are, which are interpreted as the likelihood of a given event. Pari-
mutuel betting systems work without the need of setting the market odds centrally, and
there is evidence that pari-mutuel betting markets provide unbiased forecasts of predicted
outcomes (see, for example, Debnath 2003 or Plott, Wit, and Yang 2003).
As mentioned for example in Sauer (1998), the pari-mutuel betting system is used by
racetracks in North America, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, and Great Britain.
Fixed-odds betting is very common in sports betting (betfair.com, bwin.com, etc.). A
growing number of companies organize usually web-based markets with both a pari-
mutuel betting system  mostly for horse racing and xed-odds betting markets 
for other types of sports (for example centrebet.com). For more examples of web-based
markets (both prediction and betting mechanisms) see, for instance, Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2004) or the Appendix of this chapter.
1.2.3 The Success of Prediction and Betting Markets
Evidence (empirical and experimental, see Berg et al. 2008 or Chen and Plott 2002 as
an example) so far suggests that both prediction and betting markets are surprisingly
accurate in predicting a wide range of uncertain future events: be it sports events, election
outcomes, or the completion dates of corporate projects. The reasons seem to be manifold:
First, they are often able to aggregate information that is dispersed (Chen and Plott
2002); second, anonymous trading makes participants more likely to reveal what they
really know (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 2003); and, nally, well-constructed prediction
markets are dicult to manipulate (Rhode and Strumpf 2004).
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We argued above, that there is no doubt that both prediction and betting markets
work well. However, it is not so clear whether there are some apparent advantages of one
mechanism over the other. In other words, do prediction markets perform systematically
better than betting markets for example? The answer to this question appears to be
negative. If one mechanism or the other was better in all circumstances, there would
not be a need for both of them. This brings us to an even more interesting question.
Do prediction markets prevail in some settings and betting markets in others? Are
there environments for which one or the other type of market is more suitable? To our
knowledge, no research provides insight into these issues. The authors of prediction and
betting markets literature provide no justication for their choice of market.
In this chapter, we analyze the key characteristics of both prediction and betting
markets. Whenever possible, we support our arguments and conjectures with all relevant
theoretical and experimental articles on prediction and betting markets that we know of.
We exclude empirical research on prediction and betting markets because this area of
research is focused on understanding traders' behavior and its consequences (eciency,
favorite long-shot bias, etc.) rather than on decisions about the basic market design such
as the choice between a prediction and betting mechanism.
Based on the key characteristics of prediction and betting markets, we try to un-
derstand what the proper choice of the market might be (if there is one) in various
circumstances. We conjecture that these key characteristics have implications in terms
of market simplicity and exibility combined with the capability to provide accurate
predictions (eciency), and this determines the suitable form of the market in various
settings.
While a betting market seems to be a proper choice in large-scale markets with possi-
bly unexperienced traders (e.g. sports betting), a prediction market appears to be more




Both prediction and betting markets generate predictions of outcomes of uncertain future
events. We summarize their key characteristics4 in the table below, and we discuss every
characteristic in the following sections.
Prediction Market Betting Market
Aggregation of Information yes yes
Insiders enter early enter late
Occurrence of Bubbles lower higher
Expected Payo known known only ex-post
Price market clearing xed
Risk-less Portfolio exists does not exist
Trading continuous no re-selling
Prot for the Market Maker positive positive
Liquidity limited unlimited
Figure 1. A summary of key characteristics of prediction and betting markets.
1.3.1 Aggregation of Information
In this section, we establish the fact, that both prediction and betting markets have the
capacity to aggregate information. By information aggregation we mean the fact, that
the likelihood of individual events determined by market prices is close to the probability
distribution that would exist if all traders pooled their private bits of information.
Moreover, we point out that both types of markets have sucient capacity to attract
traders with accurate information about some uncertain future events. We refer to these
traders as insiders. There is a very close relationship between the presence of insiders
and the accuracy of predictions. In the subsequent section, we discuss which market
mechanism gives insiders more power to drive market prices towards their true value and
hence leads to more accurate predictions.
Although it is already well established that prediction and betting markets can be used
to aggregate disseminated pieces of information and can generate accurate predictions of
4Some of these characteristics are supported by existing literature, others are our conjectures yet to
be tested. Which is the case is stated when we discuss these characteristics in further detail below.
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a variety of uncertain future events such as elections, project completion or sports events,
it is not well understood why these markets perform so well.
Notwithstanding a growing body of prediction and betting markets literature, theoret-
ical questions concerning how traders learn information from the market price (odds) and
how markets aggregate dispersed pieces of information remain unresolved. Plott, Wit,
and Yang (2003) state that there is no clear theoretical reason why pari-mutuel systems
should aggregate information at all. However, the implicit prices on their experimental
markets are very close to the prices that would exist if all agents pooled their information
and made decisions on the basis of the pooled data. This observation suggests that the
information in their markets does aggregate.
Relatedly, Roust and Plott (2005) raise the important question whether the odds that
emerge from a betting process have the characteristics of the probability distribution over
the possible states that results from the pooling of information held by all individuals.
Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) suggest that the answer is positive except for the fact
that the odds frequently overstate the probability of rare events and underestimate the
probability of favorites. Further, Berg and Rietz (in Hahn and Tetlock 2006, pp 142-
169) and Forsythe et al. (1992) present open issues that need to be addressed in future
research including a theoretical model of prediction markets consistent with observed
trader behavior.
Berlemann and Nelson (2005) also present an interesting open theoretical question
concerning the way in which traders learn information from the market price. This
question is a key problem in understanding the process of aggregating information on
prediction markets because the market price is not a simple average of all traders' prior
expectations. As traders enter the market, they learn the expectations of other partici-
pants at least to some extent and can update their subjective predictions.
This process can be of major importance especially in the case of small-scale prediction
markets implemented within a rm where the actions of one trader have a relatively
big impact on the market price. A full understanding of the process of aggregating
information in the market is of great importance for the decision maker who can regulate
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the liquidity and the exchange of information in the market in order to enhance its
eectiveness. In other words, the aggregation of information in prediction markets is
closely related to the optimal role of the market maker.
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a) model trade and price formation in a prediction mar-
ket with risk-averse individuals having heterogenous prior beliefs, heterogenous private
information, and heterogenous attitudes toward risk. They show that the aggregation of
information cannot be easily separated from an aggregation of beliefs.5 The authors posit
that the market is in a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, i.e. traders make
correct inferences from the prices, given common knowledge of the information structure
and prior beliefs. In other words, the authors assume that prior beliefs, signal distribu-
tion, and the rationality of all traders are common knowledge; therefore, they, in fact,
assume that information does aggregate and do not model it explicitly. The authors'
results suggest that the process of information aggregation can be modeled assuming
common prior beliefs and heterogenous private information about the probability of each
outcome.
Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) present several theoretical measures of information ag-
gregation on pari-mutuel betting markets. Further, they experimentally test the ability of
pari-mutuel betting markets to work as an information aggregation device. The authors
run a series of experiments and claim that in their experimental pari-mutuel betting
markets, information aggregation occurs since the market prices implicitly determined
from the market odds are reasonably close to the aggregated information available (the
distribution derived from the pooling of all observations).
In fact, their implicit prices are closer to the aggregated information available than
the prediction of several models mentioned in their work (Decision Theory Private Infor-
mation, Competitive Equilibrium Private Information) and the statistics called Average
Opinion (the average of individual beliefs before the market opens); only the Best Opin-
ion statistics performs better than implicit market prices, i.e. bettor(s) exist who have
5Beliefs are assumed to be completely uninformative, i.e. not correlated with the actual outcome at
all. Information, on the other hand, is an informative signal, i.e. correlated with the outcome.
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more accurate beliefs before betting than the market does after the period is over.
However, Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) state that it is not clear why the information
is aggregated in their market. The main results of their paper are: First, information
was aggregated. This suggests that traders updated their private information based on
observed market odds. Second, a model based only on the use of private information (the
Decision Theory Private Information model) seems to t their data best. The authors
call this paradoxical.
Kálovcová and Ortmann (2009) replicate their experiment and their results suggest
that the paradox seems due to aggregate rather than individual level data analysis. The
authors show that market odds (a representation of data aggregated over all participants)
are indeed very close to odds that would exist if traders behaved according to the Decision
Theory Private Information model. However, the individual level data analysis suggests
that, apart from private information, traders extract signicant additional information
from observing the market odds and behavior of other traders. This process then leads
to the aggregation of pieces of information in the hands of several traders.
Roust and Plott (2005) focus their attention on ghting well-documented problems
with information aggregation in pari-mutuel betting markets (late betting, bubbles).
Their experiments show that a special "two-stage" pari-mutuel mechanism has the poten-
tial to speed up the process through which information is revealed and to reduce deceptive
behavior6 and incorrect aggregation (informational cascades).
In the rst stage, similar to a simple lottery for a xed prize, participants are endowed
with a certain amount of money which they can use to bet on their preferred outcome.
This money has no alternative use, and therefore traders have incentive to spend all of
their budget and thus reveal all the information they possess. Furthermore, only the
aggregated amount of money that is bet on each outcome is observed at the end of the
rst period, not the individual bets; hence, participants have no incentive for any kind
of deceptive behavior.
6Strategic behavior based on investing against one's beliefs in order to mislead other traders and
therefore aect market odds in a desirable direction.
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The second stage is a pari-mutuel betting system with an increasing price of tickets to
prevent waiting strategies. This two-stage pari-mutuel mechanism preserves the ability
of the betting market to aggregate information and reduces the number and intensity of
bubbles. Moreover, after the rst stage, participants learn the strength of the signal. If
the aggregated information is poor, participants are more likely to rely on their own infor-
mation which prevents the formation of bubbles and leads to a more reliable aggregation
of information.
Regarding the process of aggregation of information, in a light of above mentioned
literature, prediction markets seem to be a better choice. Pari-mutuel systems sometimes
fail tests of eciency (see e.g. Bullen 2009). As will be discussed in section 1.5, this
ineciency is most likely related to pari-mutuel betting market rigidity. Money once
invested cannot be taken back, and the more money in total that is bet, the lower the
eect is of additional bets on the market odds. Therefore, traders who place bets towards
the end of the market  it is usually informed traders who wait  have no signicant
impact on the market odds. On the contrary, in a continuous double auction system or
call market, the prices are determined exclusively by the last trades.
The ineciency of the pari-mutuel betting market is often tackled by the two-stage
mechanism (e.g. Roust and Plott 2005). However, the mere fact that the second stage is
needed reects poorly on the ability of pari-mutuel betting markets to aggregate infor-
mation successfully.
Favorite-longshot bias is closely related to market eciency and the aggregation of
information. This phenomenon is frequently discussed in the literature (see, for example,
Sauer 1998 or Thaler and Ziemba 1998), and it describes the situation where shares of
favorite events are underpriced, and shares of longshots are overpriced. This gives traders
who bet on a longshot a negative expected payo, and traders who bet on a favorite a
positive expected payo (if there is no house charge).
As Berg and Rietz (2010) suggest, both context and market structure might aect
the likelihood of the existence of favorite-longshot bias. The authors do not nd favorite-
longshot bias in their Iowa Prediction Market data. On the other hand, favorite-longshot
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bias is present in, for example, Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003), which we discuss in the
second chapter of this dissertation. As Berg and Rietz (2010) suggest, betting markets
may be more prone to favorite-longshot bias than prediction markets because of their
structure. The two-sided structure of prediction markets (there are both buyers and
sellers as opposed to betting markets with buyers only) allows for the easier correction of
biased prices. However, this conjecture needs to be looked at more closely and probably
experimentally tested in further research.
1.3.2 Insiders
• In a prediction market, insiders are likely to enter the market rst so that they can
exploit prot opportunities. Prices on an ecient market tend to converge to their true
value. Should there be insiders in the market, they would prot more from trading shares
early while the prices are o their true values. However, we are not aware of any evidence
of this conjecture, and it might be an interesting idea for further experimental research.
• In a betting market, insiders tend to wait and make bets late (Asch, Malkiel, and
Quandt 1984). This is so because the payo on the betting market depends on the
amount of money bet in total and, more importantly, on particular event. The higher
the betting amount is, the lower the payo. Therefore, insiders try not to reveal what
they know because it could attract more traders. In fact, they might bet on other events
rst in order to make a last-minute bet on the winner more protable.
• The situation in a xed-odds betting market is dierent. If the odds are set by a
market maker, then there is no reason for insiders to postpone their trades towards the
end of the market.
Insiders drive the prices towards their "true" values, and therefore an understanding
of their behavior on the market is of the utmost importance for a decision maker. Insiders
are likely to enter the prediction market earlier compared to a betting market. In our
experimental betting market (see Kálovcová and Ortmann 2009), we indeed observed a
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signicant proportion of late betting. In contrast, the experimental internal prediction
market that we conducted7 was very active in its early stages.
These observations are not surprising: In a betting market, insiders prot the most if
the nal market odds dier from their true values and hence are reluctant to add their
private information to the system. In prediction markets, on the other hand, insiders
prot the most from uninformed traders with inaccurate information in the early stages
of the market.
1.3.3 Occurrence of Bubbles
• In prediction markets, the probability of creating an informational bubble is lower
compared to betting markets. This is implied by the behavior of insiders, who are at-
tracted to come and trade in the early stages of the market, and therefore, the prices
reect the correct information from the early stages of the market.
• In betting markets, insiders prot from postponing their trades till the end of the
market and therefore, their information is not reected in prices till the very last moment,
and the likelihood of prices moving in the wrong direction increases.
In more detail, we conjecture that insider behavior makes the betting system more
prone to informational bubbles for two reasons.
First, as Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006c) point out, traders who have inside infor-
mation prefer to bet late not to reveal their private signal. While traders with the best
information are rather inactive, other participants use inaccurate market odds based
mostly on noisy trading to update their personal information, and informational bubbles
are likely to occur.
Second, when informed individuals start participating in the betting process, their
power to navigate prices towards the true value is very limited. If many traders participate
in the market, the total money bet on all outcomes is large relative to the bets of informed
traders. This can harm the accuracy of predictions as insiders cannot drive the wrong
7The internal prediction market at CERGE-EI is described in chapter 3.
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price to its true value because of their limited impact on the nal odds. On the other
hand, in a prediction market, the price is determined solely based on the last trade. Even
if insiders enter the market late, they can correct the price within one period because the
trading history does not aect current prices.
Based on the typical behavior of insiders, we conclude that prediction markets are
more likely to gather all the information and less likely to create informational bubbles.
However, even in prediction markets not all of the information available is necessarily
reected in market prices.
As Kyle (1985) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) point out, if the prot of insiders is
not high enough (the spread between the ask and bid price is too small, or there are not
enough uninformed traders), they do not have an incentive to trade and therefore not
all of the information is reected in the market price. Nevertheless, the same problems
are present in betting systems, where insiders do not have incentives to participate in
the market if their potential prot is small, i.e. if market odds are very close to their
true values. Moreover, apart from the common problems with insucient motivation
for insiders, the betting system also suers from a high proportion of late trading and
consequent market ineciency. Therefore, from this perspective, the prediction market
seems more of an appropriate market mechanism.
1.3.4 Expected Payo
• In a prediction market, the expected payo is known to the trader at the moment of
trade. It is the dierence between the price and a private belief about what the true value
is. The payo from a given trade does not depend on one's own subsequent activities or
on the subsequent actions of other traders.
• In a betting market, the payo will be known only at the end of the whole market.
Only when the market is closed, can nal odds, and therefore, payos be determined.
Moreover, the payo per dollar bet on a winning horse is a decreasing function of the
total bets placed on that horse.
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• In a xed-odds betting market, the situation is similar to that in a prediction market.
The expected payo is known to a trader at the time of a trade. It is the dierence
between the odds and a private belief about the likelihood of an underlying event.
1.3.5 Price
• In a continuous double auction prediction market, traders make limit orders to buy or
sell given the amount of shares for a given price. If bid price exceeds ask price, trades are
matched immediately. Moreover, any trader can accept the most advantageous current
order.
• In a call market, the price of a contract is determined such that demand is equal to
supply. The price can only be determined if at least some of limit orders to buy are
higher than some of the limit orders to sell. Otherwise, the price is not determined, and
trades do not occur.
• In a betting market, the price of a ticket is xed, and the supply is not limited. The
nal payo is determined by the demand.
1.3.6 Risk-less Portfolio
• In a prediction market, it is possible to hold a risk-less portfolio. If a trader holds one
unit of each contract in the market, he gets 1 currency unit for sure. If the sum of the
prices of all contracts is equal to 1, then the trader's net prot is equal to 0. Alternatively,
a trader can hold cash as a risk-less investment.
• In a pari-mutuel betting market, it is not possible to hold a risk-less portfolio other
than cash. Even if a trader bets one unit of money on each possible outcome, the prot
is uncertain. Depending on the actions of other bettors, this strategy can be protable,
but it is also possible that the bettor ends up with a loss.
Consider, for example, a simple pari-mutuel betting market with two bettors and two
events: A and B. The rst bettor bets one dollar on each outcome, and the second bettor
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bets one dollar on A and 3 dollars on B. If A wins, the rst bettor gets three dollars back,
and his net prot is one dollar. If, however, B wins, then the rst player gets 1.5 dollars
back and ends up with a net loss of 50 cents. In a pari-mutuel betting market, the nal
odds relevant for the prot are not known until the market is closed; therefore, traders
cannot adjust their bets such as to guarantee sure prot.
The situation is dierent in the case of a xed-odds market. In this case, based on
the odds, the bettor can bet dierent amounts of money on dierent outcomes in such a
way that he gets his investment back. Consider a simple xed-odds betting market with
two events, A and B, and odds 3:1 and 1.5:1 respectively. If a bettor bets one dollar on
A and two dollars on B, he will get a prot of three dollars irrespective of the winning
event. Note, however, that this only holds if the market maker does not take any prot
for himself. Otherwise, the value of this risk-less portfolio is negative.
In our opinion, the existence of a risk-less portfolio aects the behavior in the market
in two ways. First, some trades are motivated by hedging, and hence, we can expect
more active behavior of market participants. Second, we can observe non-zero prices of
the shares that correspond to the outcomes that are certain not to occur (as observed in
our internal prediction market).
On the betting market, the only motivation to bet on a certain outcome is to gain
a prot, and hence, traders bet only on outcomes that are, according to their private
beliefs, likely to win8.
On the prediction market, traders might want to hold a risk-less portfolio because
this portfolio can be exchanged for currency. To hold a risk-less portfolio, a trader has
to hold one share of each event and therefore has the motivation to buy the shares of
longshot events also. This brings additional liquidity to the market, but at the same
time, this type of trading brings additional noise to market prices. This noise, however,
aects prices only in the short term. In the long term, the prices of events not likely to
occur are pushed to zero.
8We exclude attempts at manipulation from this argument because as it has been shown, if possible,
manipulation is extremely dicult. See, for example, Camerer 1998 or Rhode and Strumpf 2004.
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1.3.7 Trading
• In a continuous double auction prediction market, continuous trading is possible.
Traders can buy shares, and they can resell these share later on.
• In a call market, traders can place limit orders continuously, but trades are matched
discreetly at predetermined frequency.
• In most betting markets, there is no possibility to resell the ticket once it is bought.
The possibility to cancel the bet is very rare, and even then, it is not mentioned in any
program information distributed to bettors; therefore, most bettors "were quite surprised
that cancelation is possible" Camerer (1998), p.467. Traders can make bets continuously.
Traders can bet against the original event; however, this action will not cancel the
original bet entirely. In a pari-mutuel betting market, the nal odds relevant for the
payo are not known till the end of the market. So, the bettor cannot know how much
he should bet against the original event. He could wait till the very last minute and bet
based on current odds, but the odds will still change a little, making it impossible to
cancel the bet entirely.
In a xed-odds market, the appropriate amount to be bet against the original event is
known, however, as was already mentioned above, the house charge makes this cancelation
unprotable.
1.3.8 Prot for the Market Maker
• In prediction markets, prot for the market maker usually takes the form of a per
transaction fee. Although the market maker can choose not to charge transactions, for
example in the case of small scale internal markets, to encourage trading.
• In betting markets, the market organizer usually applies a house charge (part of the
collected wagers that goes to the market maker as prot). In some cases (usually for
experimental or internal betting markets), a negative house charge can be applied to
enhance trading and information aggregation (See for example Plott, Wit, and Yang
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2003). In either case, the market maker is not at a risk of a loss.
• In a xed-odds betting market, the odds are set by a market maker who is at risk of
loosing money should he set the odds incorrectly.
1.3.9 Liquidity
• On small prediction markets, low trading activity can lead to low liquidity, which
might be discouraging for traders.
• In betting markets, the liquidity is unlimited, and traders can bet as much money as
they want. Sometimes betting takes the form of buying tickets on outcomes. In this case,
the supply of tickets is unlimited, and traders can buy as many of them as they want.
1.4 Payment Scheme
In this section, we discuss the eects of two dierent payment schemes on the accuracy
of market predictions. Participants with relevant information have to be motivated to
trade actively based on their information. This requires an appropriate payment scheme.
Our internal experimental market, discussed in chapter 3, suggests that information is
more likely to be aggregated if all traders are paid a "small" prot according to their
performance (buying for a low and selling for a high price, or buying the winning events
cheaply) compared to the system in which only a few of the most successful traders get
the "big" prize.
This observation is consistent with the results in James and Isaac (2000), where the
authors discuss the negative inuence of tournament prizes on the performance of traders.
Their argument is based on the fact that in order to win one of a limited number of prizes,
traders have to take risks, and this alternates their behavior often leading to ineciencies
on the market.
The performance of our internal prediction markets also seems to be better if par-
ticipants are required to (at least partly) invest their own money. However, Luckner
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and Weinhardt (2007) present somewhat surprising results. They study the impact of
dierent monetary incentives on prediction accuracy in a prediction market for the FIFA
World Cup 2006.
The authors conduct a eld experiment with three treatments with the same expected
payo: The subjects of the rst group were paid a xed payment irrespective of their
performance. In the second group, three of the most successful individuals were paid
according to their ordinal rank. All the other traders in the second group did not receive
any payment at all. In the third treatment, subjects' payment linearly depended on the
traders' deposit value in the prediction market and was therefore directly inuenced by
every transaction a trader conducted.
The authors show that performance-related payment schemes do not necessarily in-
crease the prediction accuracy. Due to the risk aversion of traders, the competitive
environment in a rank-order tournament leads to the best results in terms of prediction
accuracy. Further, even the group with the xed payment beats the group with the
performance-compatible payment.
Another issue related to the payment scheme is whether participants should be re-
quired to invest their own money for trading. Using one's own real money seems to have
two eects: First, participants are more careful when making trading decisions (with
less risky behavior, we observe more diversication in trading) and traders have stronger
incentives to participate actively in the market. Second, fewer uninformed traders are
attracted to the market if they can lose their own money, and hence, there is more
information present in the system.
1.5 The Complexity and Flexibility of Prediction and
Betting Markets
We observe that prediction markets are signicantly more widespread and being used in
forecasting for a great variety of events (political markets, corporate markets, entertain-
ment industry, sports markets), while betting markets prevail mostly in sports betting.
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To our best knowledge, the reasons for this dierence have not been discussed in the
existing literature. In light of their key characteristics, we conjecture that this selection
appears mainly due to two reasons: simplicity; and eciency combined with exibility.
First, sports betting (mostly organized through the Internet) is intended for the gen-
eral public, and the betting market environment is somewhat easier to understand. There
is only one side of the market (buyers) so no direct interaction between buyers and sell-
ers is needed. Moreover, loosely speaking, given the market odds the only decision to
be made is how much money to bet on a favorite outcome. Hence, the betting system
appears to be more convenient if we expect mostly unexperienced traders to participate.
On the other hand, trading in a prediction market (typically organized as a continuous
double auction or a call market) requires a much better understanding of the market
mechanism. Traders need to continuously follow the orders of other traders and decide if
they want to accept them or if they want to place their own limit orders. In other words,
the prediction market mechanism requires more sophisticated behavior from traders and
therefore seems more suitable for more experienced traders, smaller scale markets, or
internal markets, where sucient support can be provided to traders.
On some occasions, prediction markets can be organized in such a way that traders
do not submit limit orders. Rather, they submit their subjective probabilities of the
likelihood of each event, how condent they are about this likelihood, and the quantity
of shares they are willing to buy. Based on this information, limit orders are generated
for them. Essentially, the buy order is generated for the most likely event(s), and sell
orders are generated for events not likely to occur. The price is determined based on how
condent traders are about their belief. One case of this type of market is reported in
Polgreen, Nelson, and Neumann (2007). This makes trading in prediction markets much
easier; however, it also imposes limitations on the exibility of traders to place multiple
limit orders and to make multiple trades at dierent prices.
Despite its relative diculty, the prediction market mechanism seems to be preferred
in various forecasting problems. This seems due to its apparent advantages, mainly higher
eciency and exibility, and this is our second reason for the prevailing use of prediction
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markets. As Bullen (2009) points out, in a betting market, the exibility of market odds
decreases signicantly as the total money bet in the market increases. Moreover, waiting
strategies can be protable (insiders want to wait to be able to place bets with favorable
market odds), and hence, there is no incentive to achieve eciency before the market
closes.
This contrasts with the continuous double auction market or call market in which
prices reect the most recent trade. Moreover, prots can be made at any time, and
hence, traders do not wait till the end of the market, and their information is reected
in the prices sooner. Therefore, the aggregation of information is more ecient. All
in all, while relatively complicated, the prediction market mechanism seems to be more
exible and more ecient and therefore more likely to be used to forecast a great variety
of uncertain outcomes.
The system of trading and the process of how prices are determined are very closely
related to the role of insiders and their impact on the nal prices. The prediction market
is more exible because traders can resell shares that they bought should they change
their beliefs about the probabilities of nal outcomes. As a result, the prices of shares
of events that are not likely to occur drop towards the end of the market easily because
the prices in a prediction market reect the last trade and therefore the latest beliefs of
traders.
The evidence from our short-term internal prediction market supports this hypothe-
sis. In our market designed to predict the number of received applications for a Ph.D.
program in economics at CERGE-EI, Prague, the prices of several shares dropped to zero
immediately after it was certain that the underlying outcomes will not occur. In a betting
system, tickets that are bought cannot be returned nor resold.9 This means that even if
traders learn during the duration of the market that some outcome is unlikely to occur,
the tickets betting on this outcome cannot be returned, and the only way to decrease the
odds for a given event is to signicantly increase betting on other events.
9The possibility to cancel a bet is very rare and usually not known by most traders (Camerer 1998).
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1.6 Conclusion
We observe that prediction markets are more widespread and being used in the fore-
casts of a great variety of events (political markets, corporate markets, entertainment
industry, and sports markets), while betting markets prevail mostly in sports betting. To
our knowledge, no research provides insight into this conguration. The prediction and
betting markets literature provide no justication for the choice of the market type.
We analyzed the key dierences between prediction and betting markets, and we con-
jecture that this selection appears mainly due to two reasons: simplicity and eciency
combined with exibility. Betting systems are very simple and therefore suitable for
large-scale markets with participation of general public and hence a high ratio of unexpe-
rienced traders. Prediction markets tend to be more ecient but also more complex, and
therefore, appropriate mostly for experienced traders or in small-scale markets, where the
necessary support can be provided.
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1.7 Appendix
EXAMPLES OF PREDICTION AND BETTING MARKETS10
• Political events
 next president, election outcomes (general, senate, governor), next party leader,
new EU members, resignation (Iowa political prediction market is analyzed in
Berg et al. 2008 and Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 2003)
• Financial bets
 house prices, interest rates, indices (Dow Jones, FTSE, DAX,...), currencies
(exchange rates), macroeconomic indicators (ination), commodities (gold,
oil), tax futures, GDP, CPI, international trade balance (Two ination pre-
diction markets are reported in Berlemann and Nelson 2005 and Berlemann,
Dimitrova, and Nenovsky 2006.)
• Social events
 Osama bin Laden's capture, US air strike against Iran, Hamas recognition of
Israel, Bird u, terrorist attacks
• Public policies
 Is it worthy to introduce a new vaccination program? Cost-benet analysis of
policies
• Sporting events (A large body of empirical literature exists that analyzes the data
sets from sport betting markets)
• Movie and TV industry
 movie sales, box oce returns, next TV competition winner, Emmy and
Grammy awards
• Corporate level indicators
 sales forecasts, project time schedule, generating new ideas (E.g. Chen and
Plott 2002; Ortner 1997; Ortner 1998)
• Weather forecast (hurricane), locating a lost submarine, what drugs will be suc-
cessful
10Main sources: www.betfair.com, www.tradesports.com, www.hedgestreet.com
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Chapter 2
Understanding the Plott-Wit-Yang Paradox1
Co-authored with Andreas Ortmann
2.1 Introduction
A (parimutuel) betting market as typically used in horse racing and other sports events,
is a system in which all bets are collected and the payos are then determined by dividing
the total amount of money invested by the amount betted on the winning horse.
In Plott, Wit & Yang (2003), the authors address experimentally two fundamental
questions: rst, is information aggregated on betting markets? Noting that there is no
clear theoretical reason why betting markets should aggregate information at all, the au-
thors report that the implicit prices on their experimental markets are very close to the
prices that would exist if all agents pooled their information and made decisions on the
basis of the pooled data. This observation suggests that the information in their mar-
kets does aggregate. Second, which model explains best how information is aggregated?
The theoretical model which seems to t their data best (the Decision Theory Private
1An earlier version of this work has been published in The Journal of Prediction Markets
3(3). pp. 33-44.
All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the authors.
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Information, or DTPI, model) does not rely on information aggregation whatsoever. The
authors call this paradoxical. We refer to their result below as the Plott-Wit-Yang (PWY)
paradox.
We replicate their experiment with minor changes and nd, rst and like Plott et
al., a paradoxical result, which is information is aggregated while the data seem to be
explained best by a theoretical model that does not require information aggregation.
We show that market odds are indeed very close to odds that would exist if traders be-
haved according to the DTPI model. However, our individual level data analysis suggests
that, apart from private information, traders extract signicant additional information
from observing the market odds. The PWY paradox seems due to aggregate rather than
individual level data analysis.
We also observe a learning eect: In later rounds traders seem to understand the
mechanism of the betting market better and put higher weight on the information con-
tained in the market odds rather than private signals. One plausible explanation is that
subjects become increasingly familiar with the laboratory environment.
Finally, we examine the eect of risk-aversion on traders' behavior. We nd that the
degree of risk aversion does not have any impact on the amount of money traders bet in
our experimental market.
In the next section, we discuss the PWY paradox, illustrate our explanation, and
formally state our hypothesis. In section 3, we explain design and implementation of our
experiment. Results are reported in section 4, and we conclude in section 5.
2.2 The PWY Paradox
The paradox consists of two results that contradict each other: rst, information is
aggregated on the market, i.e. traders are involved in some sort of strategic behavior.
Second, if we want to simulate the behavior of traders, our best bet is to use the DTPI
model which is based on the use of private signals only. Our explanation of the PWY
paradox is based on a detailed analysis of the second result. We show that, while aggregate
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level data might suggest that traders follow the DTPI model, individual data analysis
might lead to a dierent conclusion because two dierent trading behaviors can lead to
the same aggregate results. Our argument can be illustrated by the following example:
Example: Suppose that there are only two traders on the market (Trader 1 and Trader 2)
with the same budget and only two ex-ante equally likely events A and B that traders can
bet on. Further suppose that based on their private signal, Trader 1 thinks that A is the
winning event, and Trader 2 thinks that B is more likely to win. If both traders behave
according to the DTPI model, then every trader invests all the money into the more
likely event and the resulting market odds are 2:1 for both events A and B. Alternatively,
traders can behave strategically and by observing the other trader's actions, they learn
about each other's information. Consequently, they both invest half of the budget into
each event. Again, the resulting market odds are 2:1 for each event.
When searching for an underlying model, Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) look at the
aggregate level data and conclude correctly that the prediction of the DTPI model ts
market odds the best. In terms of the example above, Plott et al. observe market odds 2:1
for each event and claim that the prediction of the DTPI model is also 2:1 for each event,
and hence, traders follow this model. Our evidence suggests that it is not necessarily
true.
Hypothesis: Traders do take into account information contained in their private signals
and information contained in market odds. In other words, traders observe behavior of
others and based on market odds, they update private beliefs. Through this process
information is aggregated and translated into market odds.
2.3 Our Experimental Betting Market
Because the original data are lost, we replicate the Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) design.
We change minor implementation details all designed to allow us to analyze the impact
of risk-aversion.2
2The experiment was programmed in z-Tree Fischbacher (2007). Instructions for this experiment and
the data can be found at: http://home.cerge-ei.cz/kalovcova/research.html
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2.3.1 Design
The design of our betting market follows the one in Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003). Subjects
bet on six events labeled A, B, C, D, E, and F which are equally likely ex ante. In each
round, one of the letters is drawn at random from an urn, recorded, and then placed back
into the urn. In other words, the draw of an event is independent across rounds, and
the history of draws holds no implications of what future draws might be. Which of the
events wins is announced after the end of each round.
After the winning event is chosen, each individual is privately given a noisy signal
(or "clue") about the winning event. The clues are determined independently for each
individual by the following procedure. Once the winning event is determined, a new
urn is created with ve letters of the winning event and two letters from each of the
other events. The participant is informed of the outcome of three random draws with
replacement. The information distributed across all participants in a session is more than
that of any one individual. However, this information is not sucient to determine the
winner with absolute certainty.
2.3.2 Implementation
Employing 109 undergraduate students, we conducted our experiment in four sessions in
February 2008 and an additional ve sessions in March 2009 each of which consisted of
one trial round (which did not aect the earnings and was intended to make subjects
familiar with the software) and then continued with 16 regular rounds.
Time, in seconds, was displayed on each computer screen. The duration of each round
was 120-300 seconds - the time of duration was chosen randomly and independently for
each round and was unknown. At the end of the experiment, four rounds were randomly
chosen, and subjects were paid based on their performance in the paying periods.
The price of each event ticket was 1 ECU (experimental currency unit), once a ticket
was bought it could be neither returned nor resold. At the beginning of each round
subjects were endowed with 300 ECU, which they were free to spend or to keep. The
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part of the endowment not spent declined in value as subjects were allowed to keep only
three-quarters of it. After subjects spent their entire endowment, they could get a loan
of 600 ECU, which had to be paid back after the end of each round.
The payo for each round was determined in the following way:
Payo = 0.75 × money on hand (part of the endowment or loan not spent)
+ prot
− loan payback (if the loan was taken),
where
prot = Total ECU from all ticket sales
Total number of winning tickets sold
× Number of winning tickets held.
The implementation of our experimental betting market diers from that in Plott, Wit,
and Yang (2003) in four respects. All four changes served the additional purpose of
creating a betting market in which we could observe the eect of risk aversion. That risk
aversion might have an impact is strongly suggested by the literature. For a recent and
comprehensive review see Harrison and Rutström (2008).
We believe, and the evidence below suggests, that these dierences in implementation
do not aect the participants' behavior to the extent that is relevant for an examination
of the PWY paradox. In the section below, we discuss the implementation changes. In
the results section, we discuss briey the eects of the risk aversion and the specics
of the risk-aversion instrument we used. We focus, however, mostly on results directly
connected to the PWY paradox.
1. Risk-aversion. To measure the level of risk aversion, we administered the assessment
instrument proposed in Holt and Laury (2002) and now widely used for that purpose.
Participants were nancially incentivized for this part of the experiment. To control for
the order eect, we administrated the risk aversion measure prior to the betting market
part of the experiment in the rst four sessions and after the betting market part in the
next ve sessions of our experiment.
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2. House bonus. In Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) a house bonus is used. A house
bonus is the money added to the total amount of money invested by all the subjects.
The expected payo from the investment is thus strictly positive and gives risk-averse
subjects better incentives to invest: The house bonus makes investment more protable
and the more subjects invest the more information can be aggregated. The house bonus
seems responsible for the successful information aggregation on the betting markets in
Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003).
However, this mechanism calls for investing in the market as much as possible. Hence,
the traders who fully understand this mechanism invest all the money they have irre-
spective of their attitude towards risk. Only extremely risk-averse subjects would do
otherwise. In real betting markets, a house charge is used instead of a house bonus. The
expected payo from the investment is then slightly negative, and risk-aversion is likely
to play a signicant role. In our experimental betting market, neither house bonus nor
house charge is used.
3. Endowment depreciation. Without a house bonus, traders are less motivated to
invest in the market. Pilot experiments that we conducted conrmed this hypothesis:
Subjects spend 78% of all the money at their disposal in markets with a house bonus,
whereas they spend only 64% in markets without a house bonus. To enhance the process
of information aggregation, we wanted to make sure that traders would spend a major
part of their endowment.
Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003) use an experimental design in which the part of the
endowment that is not spent is lost. This makes all subjects spend the entire endowment.
In our betting market, the part of the endowment that is not spent declines in value, and
subjects are allowed to keep only three-quarters of it. This design creates strong incentives
for subjects to spend a major part of the endowment and thus allows for information
aggregation. At the same time, extremely risk-averse participants are allowed to keep all
of the endowment and earn a small but sure prot. Hence, we enhance the process of
aggregating the information while keeping risk-aversion to play as a signicant aspect.
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4. Paying periods. After completing the experiment, we randomly selected four periods
for which subjects were paid and this was ex-ante known to all participants. (In Plott,
Wit, and Yang (2003) subjects were paid in all rounds.)
We implemented this payment mode to prevent subjects doing nothing and only
shortly before the market is closed investing all their money into the event with the
lowest odds, i.e. the most likely event. Most of the time the true event is identied
successfully, and hence, the sniping strategy that we observed in pilot markets leads to
a large long-run prot (negative prot in a few periods is oset by a large positive prot
in most of the periods).
However, extensive waiting worsens information aggregation because subjects who
wait keep their private information away from the market. With our payment mode,
waiting and investing everything in the most likely event becomes less attractive because
those periods where the prot is negative could be chosen to be paying periods.
We realize that based on the expected utility theory, this payment scheme should not
alter traders' behavior at all. If the expected payo from sniping is positive in one period,
then it is positive in all periods and vice versa. However, based on our pilot experiments
where we observed a signicant amount of sniping and based on ex post discussions with
our pilot market subjects, we decide to employ this payment scheme. In subsequent
experiments, the sniping signicantly decreased. The reason might be connected to the
loss aversion of our subjects.
However, we did not analyze this issue more closely because this was not the area of
our research. The bottom line is that we implemented our market in such a way as to
give information aggregation the best chance. Our payment scheme either helped limit
undesirable sniping or did not aect the timing of bets at all, and late betting observed
in pilot markets was just unusual behavior.
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2.4 Results
We start this section with two results that constitute the Plott-Wit-Yang paradox. Then
we follow with the third - key result - that supports our hypothesis, and we nish with
three supplementary results concerning learning eect, market eciency, and the eect
of risk-aversion.
Result 1: Information is aggregated. Similar to Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003), we
nd evidence in favor of information aggregation. The results are provided in Table 1
below in the form of the Würtz3 measure of the distance of model predictions from AIA
(Aggregated Information Available, i.e. posterior probabilities given the pooled signal of
all traders). The Würtz measure is computed for aggregate data. For example, the Würtz
measure of distance between DTPI and AIA is determined in the following way: First,
we compute what market odds would be if all traders behaved according to the DTPI
model and determine the corresponding probability distribution pi. Then we take the
probability distribution given by AIA, qi, and use the formula in Footnote 2 to compute
their distance.
In Table 1 below we follow the notation in Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003):
• Decision Theory Private Information Model (DTPI) - a model where traders base their
decisions exclusively on their own private information and bet all their money on the
most likely event.
• Competitive Equilibrium Private Information Model (CEPI) - a model where traders
take market odds as constants and maximize their expected prot with respect to their
private information.4
• Average Opinion statistics (AO) - the average of individual beliefs before the market
opens.
3If the discrete distributions are described by their probability density functions {pi}i=1...K and
{qi}i=1...K respectively, then the measure proposed by Wurtz (1997) can be written as W (p, q) =
0.5
∑K
i=1 |pi − qi|.
4We use the method described in Eisenberg and Gale (1959) and Mathematica to compute equilibrium
odds.
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• Best Opinion statistics (BO) - the most accurate belief among traders' beliefs before
betting.
• Implicit prices (IP) - market prices implicitly determined by the market odds.
Table 1: Average Würtz measure of distance from AIA:
all periods:
Best Opinion IP DTPI Average Opinion CEPI
0.380 (0.163) 0.495 (0.193) 0.515 (0.102) 0.634 (0.099) 0.663 (0.101)
last 8 periods:
Best Opinion IP DTPI Average Opinion CEPI
0.427 (0.187) 0.489 (0.191) 0.511 (0.111) 0.627 (0.105) 0.657 (0.109)
The results in Table 1 show that the distribution of probabilities based on IP is closer
to the distribution given by AIA than the prediction of any other model except BO. For
example, in the rst row of Table 1, the Würtz measure of the distance between AIA and
IP is 0.495, which is lower than the Würtz measure of the distance between AIA and any
other model expect BO. This means that apart from BO, IP is closer to the AIA than
the prediction of any other model.
We also observe some indication that information aggregation can improve over time.
At the beginning of the experiment, the information aggregation is weaker, which is
probably caused by the inexperience of participants (the average Würtz measure of the
distance between AIA and IP across all periods is 0.495). As the experiment continues,
participants understand the mechanism better, behave more strategically, and try to
update their own signal based on what happens on the market. Hence in later periods,
the information aggregation is more obvious (the average Würtz measure of the distance
between AIA and IP across the last 8 periods is 0.489). Due to the low number of
observations, the dierence in Würtz measure during the rst and last 8 periods is not
statistically signicant.
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Result 2: DTPI model best ts the data from betting markets.
Table 2: The average Würtz measure of distance of model predictions from IP:
all periods:
DTPI Average Opinion CEPI Best Opinion AIA
0.261 (0.124) 0.306 (0.193) 0.330 (0.134) 0.324 (0.161) 0.495 (0.134)
last 8 periods:
DTPI Average Opinion CEPI Best Opinion AIA
0.269 (0.126) 0.330 (0.123) 0.355 (0.120) 0.340 (0.169) 0.489 (0.191)
The average Würtz measure of the distance between IP and DTPI across all periods
(0.261) and across the last 8 periods (0.269), is lower than the average Würtz measure
of the distance between IP and any other model. This means that the DTPI model best
ts the experimental data. Results 1 and 2 are in line with the results in Plott, Wit, and
Yang (2003) and constitute the PWY paradox. In the following section, we provide an
explanation for this paradox.
Result 3: Our PWY paradox explanation is supported by the data.
First, we nd that traders invest on average one-third of their overall investment
into events that they should ignore according to DTPI model. Second, we compare the
observed individual distribution of bets to the distribution of bets implied by private
signals (the DTPI model) and the distribution of bets implied by market odds (bets are
in proportion to their probabilities implied by market odds). For this comparison, we use
again the Würtz measure.
Our hypothesis is that traders take into account information contained in their private
signals and in market odds, which implies that the Würtz measure (Würtz criterion, WC)
of distance between observed individual behavior and the private signal is approximately
the same or larger than the WC of distance between observed individual behavior and
behavior induced by the market odds (WC[Behavior-Signal]≥WC[Behavior-Odds]. Note
that the smaller WC, the shorter is the distance between the two distributions).
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We run a t-test on our data and nd extensive support for this hypothesis. We
can reject the null-hypothesis that the Würtz measure between observed behavior and
market odds is the same as the Würtz measure between observed behavior and a pri-
vate signal (WC[Behavior-Odds]=WC[Behavior-Signal]) in favor of the alternative hy-
pothesis that the Würtz measure between observed behavior and market odds is lower
than the Würtz measure between observed behavior and a private signal (WC[Behavior-
Odds]<WC[Behavior-Signal]) at any reasonable level of signicance (p-value is 0.00). In
other words, we nd support for the fact that traders rely on the signal contained in
market odds more than they rely on their private information.5
Moreover for every trader, we analyze separately periods with a strong signal (at least
two out of three draws are the same; i.e. the probability of the most likely event is 50%
or 75%) and a weak signal (all three draws are dierent; i.e. three most likely events are
equally likely with probability to occur equal to 24% each). We nd that traders follow
market odds more closely than their private signal irrespective of the quality of their
private signal. We can reject the null-hypothesis, WC[Behavior-Odds]=WC[Behavior-
Signal], in favor of the alternative, WC[Behavior-Odds]<WC[Behavior-Signal], at any
reasonable level of signicance (p-value is 0.00 in both cases).
To provide an additional insight into the data, we analyze the group of rounds in
which the private signal is in line with market odds and the group of rounds in which the
private signal and market odds dier. We nd that
• in the rst group, WC[Behavior-Odds]=WC[Behavior-Signal] (p=0.10 with a two-sided
alternative hypothesis; p=0.05 with a one-sided alternative hypothesis).
• in the second group, WC[Behavior-Odds]<WC[Behavior-Signal] (p=0.00).
Therefore, we conclude that traders form a weighted average of their private signal
and market odds with approximately equal weights when their signal is consistent with
market odds. However, traders trust their private signal signicantly less if it contradicts
the market odds.
5We also ran a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The results are qualitatively the same.
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Result 4: Traders' behavior is increasingly inuenced by public signals.
We analyze the rst and the last eight periods of our experiment separately, and we
nd support for a learning eect: We nd that traders follow market odds more than
private signals in the rst eight periods, and they rely on market odds even signicantly
more during the last eight. In particular, traders follow private signals slightly less in
latter periods (however, this result is not statistically signicant), and secondly, traders
follow market odds signicantly more in latter periods (p-value is 0.00).
These results suggest that after the traders understand the mechanism of betting
markets better and learn that the market works well identifying the winning event, traders
shift weight towards the public information in the form of market odds.
Result 5: Market is ecient. The betting experiment exhibits weak statistical e-
ciency.
Table 3: Winning probabilities assigned by the betting market and actual frequencies of
winning.
Frequency of Standard Error of
Market Rank by IP Average IP Winning Frequency of Winning t-statistics
1st 0.517 0.660 0.150 -1.060
2nd 0.191 0.132 0.077 0.522
3rd 0.108 0.125 0.044 -0.205
4th 0.078 0.069 0.034 0.250
5th 0.060 0 0.030 2.014
6th 0.046 0.014 0.026 1.220
In Table 3, markets are ranked according to the average implicit price (IP) for all
sessions. The average IP of the 1st market is 0.517. Actual relative winning frequency
of the 1st market is 0.660. We cannot reject the null-hypothesis, the two distributions
(column 2 and column 3) are the same. As a result, we cannot reject the weak statistical
eciency of this betting market with the exception of the 5th market for which the
implicit price is signicantly larger than the actual frequency of winning. Hence, the
eciency of the market is not so profound. We also observe a favorite long-shot bias in
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our markets: the market probability for favorites is understated (0.517 with an actual
winning frequency of 0.660) and the probability for long-shots is overstated (0.046 with
an actual winning frequency of 0.014). However, this result is not statistically signicant.
Result 6: Risk Aversion Does not Aect the Level of Investment.
Out of 109 participants in our experiments, there were 24 participants for whom the
level of risk-aversion could not be measured, and they were omitted from further analysis.6
We divide the remaining 88 participants (35 from the rst and 50 from the second round
of experiments) into two groups - 51 more (15 from the rst and 36 from the second
round of experiments) and 34 less (20 from the rst and 14 from the second round of
experiments) risk averse participants.
The null-hypothesis, that less and more risk-averse participant spend on average the
same amount of money, cannot be rejected at any level of signicance (p-value is 0.9)
in favor of the alternative hypothesis, less risk-averse traders spend more money. We
do not observe any signicant dierence in risk-aversion distribution (the p value in the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test is 0.43).
If we analyze the 2008 data, where risk-aversion measure comes rst, separately, we
nd that less risk-averse participants spend on average 20% more than more risk-averse
individuals. The null-hypothesis, less and more risk-averse participant spend on average
the same amount of money, can be rejected at the 10% level of signicance (p-value is
0.9) in favor of the alternative hypothesis, less risk-averse traders spend more money. We
can say that more risk-averse individuals will participate less, and hence, their private
information will have less of an impact on implied prices, with a resulting loss in eciency.
If the risk-aversion measure comes second (2009 experiment), participants invest on
average the same amount irrespective of their risk aversion. We tested for the order
eect of the risk aversion assessment instrument, and we did not nd any dierences in
the participants' distribution of risk aversion among the rst series and the second series
of sessions.
6These individuals made multiple switches between the safe and risky lottery.
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2.5 Conclusion
We replicated the experimental betting market in Plott, Wit, and Yang (2003). Our data
conrm the Plott et al. ndings on their level of analysis. Specically, our analysis showed
that aggregate data suggest that traders follow the DTPI model. Individually, traders
take into account information and the behavior of other traders in the form of market
odds, though. Based on this nding, we explained the PWY paradox. Furthermore, we
found a learning eect on our betting market. In later rounds, traders put less weight on
their private signal and rely more on the signal contained in market odds. Finally, we do
not nd any eect of a degree of risk aversion on traders behavior.
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Chapter 3
A Prediction Market for Applications1
3.1 Introduction
Prediction markets (also known as information markets, decision markets, or idea futures)
are speculative markets created for the purpose of making predictions. Participants trade
assets whose nal cash value is tied to a particular event (e.g., will the next US president
be a Republican) or parameter (e.g., total sales next quarter). Current market prices can
then be interpreted as predictions of the probability of an event or the expected value of
a parameter.
Evidence cited below suggests that these markets are at least as accurate as other
institutions predicting the same events with a similar pool of participants. The reasons
are manifold: First, prediction markets are often able to aggregate information that is
dispersed (Chen and Plott 2002 and Forsythe, Neslon, Neumann, and Wright 1992) and
provide accurate forecasts in spite of individual biases and errors (Forythe, Rietz, and
Ross 1999); second, anonymous trading makes participants more likely to reveal what
they really know (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz 2003); and third, well-constructed prediction
markets are dicult to manipulate (Rhode and Strumpf 2004).
1The author would like to thank Andreas Ortmann and Peter Katu²£ák for comments
and Jan Myslive£ek for substantial help with the implementation of this project. Support
through GDN grant No. RRC VIII-89 is gratefully appreciated.
All errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the author.
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Economists have started to investigate the potential use of prediction markets in
companies' decision making. Indeed, a small but growing number of companies have been
creating their own prediction markets over the past decade. Robert Charette mentions
several examples in his article:2 French Telecom Group, for example, created a prediction
market to analyze technological trends; Google has created an internal prediction market
to forecast product launch dates, new oce openings, etc.
Similarly, Hewlett-Packard created its own internal market system to help predict
critical business issues such as the quarterly sales forecast or the price of certain products
in one, three, or six months. HP has found that its internal market predictions are often
more accurate than the company's "ocial" forecasts (for instance, six out of eight times,
the market was better at predicting computer sales).
Many other companies are experimenting with or creating dierent types of internal
prediction markets: Microsoft (for predicting product shipping dates); GE (for discovering
new ideas); Eli Lilly (for discovering new drug candidates); and Siemens (for improving
the accuracy of product developments).
Theoretical research has limited possibilities in analyzing the use of prediction markets
within corporate businesses or institutions. It has been demonstrated through laboratory
experiments that properly designed markets can aggregate information. However, it
is also clear that this ability is closely related to market design and implementation.
Therefore, eld experiments present a very useful tool for analyzing and understanding
better internal prediction markets. In this paper, we report the results of our prediction
market implementation.
We conducted an experimental prediction market at CERGE-EI, Prague, to forecast
the number of applications received for the 2009/2010 Ph.D. program. Our goal was to
examine if this specic prediction market can work in a sense that it attracts enough
informed traders and reects their collective beliefs in prices. We believed that a little
was known about the plausible number of applications by any single individual, but the
2An Internal Futures Market, BI Review Magazine, February 28, 2007. http://www.information-
management.com/bissues/20070301/2600311-1.html. Accessed on November 6, 2009.
46
aggregation of pieces of information might be considerable. Therefore we decided to im-
plement a prediction market within our institution to examine the capacity of prediction
markets to aggregate information in this very particular setting.
To the best of our knowledge, our experimental market is the rst within an educa-
tional institution, or for that matter, within a nonprot organization. We do not overlook
the crucial pioneering role of the Iowa prediction market analyzed in Berg, Forsythe, Nel-
son, and Rietz 2008. However, we feel that our internal prediction market is unique in
the sense that the object of our forecast was an internal issue with the number of Ph.D.
program applications, unlike in the Iowa market, in that the issue of interest was national
presidential elections (or other similar markets conducted for education purposes at var-
ious universities, where the outcomes of various sports events are forecasted). In these
markets, the information that is being aggregated might already be public knowledge
(through news, surveys, or national polls). In our internal prediction market, we try to
aggregate bits of private information held by individual traders.
In our market, traders were students and faculty members who were interested in par-
ticipating and who might have felt that they have insider information about the interest
in this program. For example, some students participated in recruiting activities; faculty
members also helped in recruiting and knew about extensive nancial support for new
students, etc. The hope was to establish the prediction market as a leading indicator of
the recruitment process that potentially could aect activities in the weeks leading up to
the deadline and the ensuing selection process.
3.2 Literature Review
For internal markets to work well, a number of requirements must be met. Internal mar-
kets are usually small scale markets and hence the problem with insucient liquidity has
to be overcome. Market participants need to have sucient information about the matter
of interest. Manipulation can also be a problem in a small-scale market. Another open
question is that of the optimal role of the market maker  should we, for example, create
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an articial trader to get rid of arbitrage? Another issue is the choice of an appropriate
benchmark to measure the performance of our predictions. Unlike in laboratory experi-
mental environments, the information held by all individuals is not known, and therefore,
information aggregation cannot be measured.
Little is known about the proper design and implementation of such a market in
organizations in general and nonprots in particular. Hence, the main purpose of the
project is to run a trial market and explore its potential. In the following section, we
summarize previous experience with the implementation of similar internal prediction
markets. Based on this experience, we designed our internal prediction market.
In our review, we concentrate on the literature of similar markets to that which we
conducted. In particular, we analyze either small scale or internal prediction markets.
We do not ignore large scale markets with widely popular events being predicted (Berg
et al. 2008, Cahlík et al. 2005); however, for our purpose, the discussion of the design and
results of small and internal prediction markets is more fruitful.
Chen and Plott (2002) conducted an internal sales forecasting prediction market in
Hewlett-Packard. Their market was open during lunch and in the evening every day
over one week. The market was organized as a double auction. There were 7-26 active
participants who were trading with 10 contingent contracts. The authors note that they
chose a complete set of state contingent contracts because experiments showed that single
compound securities can have diculty with information aggregation. Participants of this
internal market received "small amounts" of cash and were also allowed to invest limited
amounts of their own money. The authors show that the prediction market performed
better than the traditional methods employed inside Hewlett-Packard.
Ortner (1997) reports on the results from a prediction market created in Siemens.
This market was created to estimate the expected delay of certain projects. This dou-
ble auction market was fully computerized and participants were trading two contracts
(project will nish in time, project will not nish in time). Out of 63 participants, 50
traded actively on a regular basis during 44 weeks of duration of the market. Participants
used real money on this market. They received 200 ATS after they invested 100 ATS of
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their own. Prices on the market converged to the stable equilibrium in about a month.
The authors claim that the results show a satisfying forecasting potential.
Berlemann and Nelson (2005) conducted an ination prediction market in Germany,
which was organized as a winner-takes-all market. Using real money, 31-44 traders par-
ticipated in this market, which was open for 3-5 months and traded eight contracts. Ac-
cording to the authors, the evidence from their pilot market is insucient to prove that
forecasts generated by experimental forecasting markets are of suciently high quality
to be used in practice. Therefore, they concentrate on how fast market prices reect the
new information, and they nd their markets ecient.
Berlemann, Dimitrova, and Nenovsky (2006) summarize the results of predicting in-
ation in Bulgaria in a similar market. The long-term market was created in combination
with short-term markets in order to increase motivation for the traders. Markets with a
3-month and 1-year horizon were open simultaneously for a period of two weeks. There
were 25 expert participants who traded 8 contracts. No real money was used. Traders
received experimental money, and the three most successful traders were awarded prizes.
Their markets were not very successful probably due to an insucient number of traders,
a problematic and insucient incentive system, a problematic market set-up, ant the
sorry state of data availability in Bulgaria, among others.
To sum up, previous internal prediction markets were conducted with mixed success.
Although market design diers in some details, the basic features of all the markets are
the same. We follow this basic design and implementation.
3.3 Our Experimental Prediction Market
Our markets were designed to predict the number of valid applications received for the
2009/10 Ph.D. program at CERGE-EI. The deadline for submitting applications was
February 28, 2009. We created two prediction markets. The rst, a long-term prediction
market, was open for 35 days from January 23 to February 26, 2009 and was designed to
predict the number of all applications. The second, a short-term market, was open for 5
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days from February 23 to February 27, 2009 and was designed to forecast the number of
applications from Czech and Slovak applicants only.
3.3.1 Design
Our markets were organized as winner-takes-all3 call markets with one or two calls per
day. In other words, all possible outcomes were partitioned into a small number of sub-
sets. Each sub-set was then related to a security. After the nal outcome was known,
the winning security, the one which contained the nal outcome, was announced. This
winning security paid 1 Virtual Dollar per share after the experiment was over. All other
securities paid nothing.
The basic structure of our prediction market is very similar to markets cited in Chen
and Plott (2002); Ortner (1997); Berlemann and Nelson (2005); and Berlemann, Dim-
itrova, and Nenovsky (2006). One signicant dierence lies in the fact that we used the
call market rather than the continuous double auction employed by the above mentioned
authors.
Our way of clearing the market once (twice) a day instead of continuous trading gave
us the following advantage: The markets were open all day, so traders had enough time
to place their orders, and they were not limited to using the computer only during a short
period of time. At the same time, traders were not discouraged by the lack of activity
on the market, which could be an issue should we employ the standard double auction
market with continuous clearing of matching orders.
Chen and Plott (2002) solved the potential low level of activity by keeping the market
open only during the lunch break. This can work very well inside a corporation where
employees take lunch breaks at the same time; however, we think that this time schedule
would be problematic for students and faculty members with highly irregular schedules.
Hence, we decided to keep markets open all day to increase the number of active traders.




The selection of participants is of utmost importance. We did not want to miss any
individual with a relevant piece of information. On the other hand, the participation of
many individuals with no useful knowledge is not desirable either.
In the internal markets mentioned in the literature section, participants were either
students (Berlemann and Nelson 2005), experts (Berlemann, Dimitrova, and Nenovsky
2006), or employees (Chen and Plott 2002, Ortner 1997). Markets with students and
employees performed well, while the Bulgarian ination market (Berlemann, Dimitrova,
and Nenovsky 2006) with expert traders failed to provide accurate predictions. The
reason seems to be mainly a problematic and insucient incentive system and problematic
market set-up rather than the choice of participants. This experience suggests that traders
do not have to be experts or have previous experience as long as they possess some relevant
information and create sucient liquidity on the market.
In our markets, participation was voluntary. It was not limited in any way. The
opening of the markets was announced publicly, and all students and faculty members
were invited to participate. We did not impose any restrictions on participation; therefore,
our participants self-selected themselves for the experiment.
We are aware of the potential problem of including too many uninformed traders,
who drive the market prices away from their true values. However, if we had used some
selection process for the participation, we might have had a problem with a low number of
participants and consequently with low liquidity on the market. We consider insucient
liquidity to be a more serious issue that would hinder the information aggregation process
signicantly.
An eort was made to make participation anonymous; however, since most of our
subjects know each other very well, we would expect some interactions among them during
the experiments. Participants were able to talk to each other during the experiment;
however, the trades were made anonymously. The traders were able to participate in one
of the markets or both; we did not impose any restrictions on participation.
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When the long-term market was open, there was no indication to traders about the
short-term market being opened later. The interest in the short-term market was lower
compared to the long-term market probably because of the fact that traders participating
in the short-term market were asked to invest their own money. All 11 traders from the
short-term market were already participating in the long-term market.
Currency and Endowment
In the rst, the long-term prediction market, participants were endowed and traded
with experimental money, and after the market was closed, the three most successful
traders received monetary prizes (380 EUR, 150 EUR, and 75 EUR). This tournament
payment scheme was employed by Berlemann, Dimitrova, and Nenovsky (2006).
In the second, the short-term prediction market, participants had to invest 12 EUR
of their own money, and this money was used for trading. The net earnings of each
participant was equal to the nal value of portfolio minus the 12 EUR investment. The
net earnings were then multiplied by a factor of 5 to encourage trading. A similar payment
scheme with real money and some form of subsidy (usually multiplying a trader's initial
investment by some factor) from a market maker was used in markets, which are discussed
in Chen and Plott (2002); Ortner (1997); and Berlemann and Nelson (2005).
We started with the design where no real money was used because we were concerned
about the participation rate if traders have to invest their own money. Our concern was
conrmed by a much lower participation in the second market requiring an investment
of the participants' own money. We might argue that the dierence in the participation
rate, in particular the much higher participation in our long-term prediction market, was
caused by high potential prizes in our long-term prediction market. However, the fact
that we multiplied net earnings in our short-term prediction market by a factor of 5
made investing in this market very protable, and a positive prot is much more likely
compared to the limited number of prizes in the long-term market.
A prediction market with no real own money invested and with tournament prizes
has two potential negative impacts. First, while we did have a sucient number of
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participants in our long-term prediction market, using virtual money attracts many un-
informed traders because there is nothing to loose, and hence, the forecast accuracy is
not overwhelming.
Secondly, the design of the rst market allows only three of the most successful traders
to win a prize. This tournament design suggests to play an all-or-nothing strategy, where
a trader chooses the most likely event according to their information and invests all the
money into buying the corresponding shares. Basically, this is the only possible winning
strategy because traders with high but not the top earnings get no prize at all.
This kind of behavior was experimentally examined for example in James and Isaac
(2000) who show that tournament incentives lead to risky individual behavior. The au-
thors argue that in order to be better than average, traders have to do something dierent
 they have to take risks. Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983) draw similar conclusions and claim
that tournaments cause traders, who would otherwise behave in a risk-neutral or even
risk-averse way, to behave as if they were risk-loving. The tournament payment scheme
was implemented for example in the Bulgarian ination prediction market discussed in
Berlemann, Dimitrova, and Nenovsky (2006). We suggest that this might be one of the
reasons why this market was not so successful.
The risky behavior which is a result of the tournament payment scheme might be
undesirable for a market maker who is interested in aggregated information because
traders choose their preferable event a priori and do not update their beliefs nor do they
try to gather additional information from the behavior of other traders. In other words,
we can learn the prior distribution of traders' beliefs, but the beliefs of an insider and
a random trader have the same weight. Usually, through the process of learning and
aggregating information, insiders earn money based on their high quality information,
and uninformed traders change their beliefs in the right direction. These two reasons led
us to change the incentivization scheme of the second market.
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3.3.2 Implementation
For both experiments, the market mechanism was web based. We developed and imple-
mented web-based, call market software, which ran on our internal server at CERGE-EI.
Traders had access to the entire market through a single web page. For an illustration,
see the screenshots in the Appendix.
When the participants logged in to the long-term market, they received a cash balance
of virtual $200 and 200 market portfolios (i.e. 200 shares of each event). The full set of
instructions was available to subjects the entire time and they were encouraged to contact
experimenter if they encountered diculties.
Participants had access to all the information about the current round, their current
share holdings, the amount of cash and the number of portfolios that they owned, and
they were able to place orders to buy/sell individual shares/market portfolios. They
also had access to detailed information about previous rounds (orders that they placed,
trades that were realized, past market prices, etc.). For details on how this information
was provided to the traders, see the Appendix of this chapter.
Market clearing
In each trading period, all orders to buy and sell shares for a particular event were
matched up to determine the trades and associated trading prices for shares. All orders
from the traders' List of Current Trading Orders were taken into account. Our long-term
prediction market was cleared daily at 3 a.m. The short-term prediction market was
cleared twice a day at 3 a.m. and 3 p.m.
Details on the process of determining the market clearing price (in the case there was
excess demand or supply and in case of ties) can be found in the Appendix.
Events and Participation
The long-term market was open for 35 days or trading periods. There were 57 participants
who registered on the market, and they were trading with the following shares:
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Event Each share pays $1 if the number of applications is









Figure 1. Denition of events on the long-term prediction market.
The short-term market: was open for 5 days or 10 trading periods. Eleven participants
were registered on the market, and they were trading with the following shares:
Event Each share pays $1 if the number of applications is








Figure 2. Denition of events on the short-term prediction market.
3.4 Results
The long-term market was open on January 23, and it was closed on February 26. How-
ever, during the last trading day, there was almost no activity on the market, and with
the exception of three securities (namely F, G, and H) no trades occurred. Therefore in
our analysis, we only work with the data until February 25, which was the 34th round
of the long-term market. The short-term market was open on February 23 and closed
on February 27. This market was open for 5 days or 10 periods (the market was cleared
twice a day).
In the table below, we show the actual number of applications during the last few
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days of our markets (and corresponding events). The end of each market is depicted by
a double horizontal line. We also provide the nal number of applications received as of
March 2, which was four days after our markets were closed and which was relevant for
determining the winning events and consequently the payos.
We skip weekends in our table because applications, which were the subject of our
prediction markets, were delivered by regular mail only during business days: Monday-
Friday.
Long-term Market Short-term Market
Total Number of Number of Applications
Date Applications (Cumulative) for CR+SR (Cumulative)
Feb 19 87 (Event B, Period 28) n.a.
Feb 20 96 (Event C, Period 29) n.a.
Feb 23 113 (Event E, Period 32) 11 [4+7] (Event A, Period 1,2)
Feb 24 120 (Event E, Period 33) 12 [4+8] (Event A, Period 3,4)
Feb 25 125 (Event F, Period 34) 14 [6+8] (Event A, Period 5,6)
Feb 26 132 (Event G, Period 35) 16 [7+9] (Event B, Period 7,8)
Feb 27 136 (Event G) 19 [7+12] (Event C, Period 9,10)
Mar 2 (Final) 140 (Event G) 21 [7+14] (Event D)
Figure 3. The actual number of applications received during the last days before the long-term and short-term prediction
markets were closed.
Activity on our Markets
We had 40 active4 traders on the long-term market and 11 on the short-term market.
All short-term market traders participated in the long-term market as well. On average,
the limit orders of 260 shares were made and traded per period on our long-term market
and 410 on the short-term market. During each period, 40% of traders were active on
average on the long-term market and two-thirds on the short-term market. The numbers
of active traders and trading activity are summarized on the graphs that follow.
4Originally, over 50 participants registered in our experiment. However, some of them placed limit
orders only during the rst period and then stopped; others did not place any orders at all. The remaining
40 participants kept trading throughout the entire experiment.
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Figure 4. The number of active participants and trading activity on our long-term prediction market.
Figure 5. The number of active participants and trading activity on our short-term prediction market.
We do not observe any signicant dierences in trading activity between the two
markets. On the long-term market, we experienced a slight increase in trading activity
and in the number of active traders towards the closing period, while activity on the
short-term market was slightly decreasing, but the behavior is not signicantly dierent.
Call timings  once a day on the long-term market, and twice a day on the short-term
market  do not seem to drive any dierences in traders' behavior.
Result 1: The short-term market generated more accurate predictions than
the long-term market.
Below, we show the distribution of prices generated by both the long-term and short-
term prediction markets. Simple prices do not seem to be an optimal measure of the
likelihood of individual events. Therefore, similarly to, for example, Chen and Plott
(2002), we used volume-weighted average price.
The volume-weighted average price (VWAP) is the ratio of the value traded to to-
tal volume traded over a particular time horizon. This way more weight is placed on
trades with higher volumes, and we decrease the impact of trades with a few securities
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for unreasonable prices, which might occur accidentally. If a price of some security is
rather constant over some time and then suddenly during one period the price changes
signicantly because of a few shares traded, this "accidental" change would be mitigated
by using WVAP. We used dierent time horizons for this purpose. We computed VWAP
for the last trading day, for the last trading week, and for the last 50% of trades (as did
Chen and Plott 2002).
The VWAP showed to be robust with respect to the choice of a time horizon. The
dierences in the resulting distributions were rather minor. Hence, we provide the graphs
for only one option. In the case of the long-term market, the VWAP is computed over the
last week of the market (seven trading days, periods 28-34). In the case of the short-term
market, we show the graph for VWAP computed over the last 50% of realized trades, the
same as Chen and Plott (2002) for their markets, which were open for one week.
Figure 6. The long-term prediction market with VWAP over the last seven trading days on the left and the short-term
market with VWAP over the last 50% of trades on the right. The red vertical line depicts the actual number of applications.
Visual inspection shows that the short-term market performed really well. Based on
the distribution generated on this market, event D corresponding to 20-21 applications
was identied as the most likely outcome. The actual number of applications received
was indeed 21.
In the long-term prediction market, the forecast was less accurate. The distribution
generated by the traders' activity on the market suggests, that events D and F are the
most likely to occur. These events correspond to 101-110 and 121-130 received appli-
cations. However, the actual number was as high as 140 applications. From Figure 6
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above, we can see that the distribution of probabilities derived from market prices is mul-
timodal. In particular, we have two favorites on our market. This can simply mean that
there were two groups of traders with dierent expectations. The fact that the prices on
the market can imply multinodal probabilistic distribution is illustrated, for example, in
Berg, Geweke, and Rietz (2010) for the Iowa prediction market data.
The accuracy of predictions is no doubt of great interest. However, the more impor-
tant issue here is whether the markets performed well in the sense that they have the
capacity to reect the aggregated knowledge of all the traders, or whether they provide an
improvement over more traditional forecasting methods. The choice of proper benchmark
and assessment of markets' performance are discussed in the next section.
Result 2: Our prediction markets worked well.
In this section, we argue that our markets worked well, and the distribution of prices
suciently reected the collective knowledge of the traders. The purpose of prediction
markets is to aggregate existing information. It might happen that traders do not possess
any signicant knowledge, and if there is not much to aggregate, the markets cannot
generate accurate predictions.
At this point, we have to choose a proper benchmark against which we can determine
how well the information was aggregated. In laboratory experiments, the information
distributed among traders is known, and hence, it is possible to measure the level of
information aggregation on the market. Unlike in laboratory experiments, in our case
the total information spread among traders is not known, and hence, it is dicult to
assess whether all the information in the hands of individual traders was aggregated or
not.
We decided to use historical data for the purpose of creating the benchmark. We look
at the number of applications during the four years before our market was organized.
In particular, we look at the number of total applications and the number of applica-
tions from Czech and Slovak students for years 2005/2006; 2006/2007; 2007/2008; and
2008/2009.
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Figure 7. The number of applications received during the four years preceding our markets.
If we look at the data from previous years and consider the decreasing trend, our "best
guess" of the number of applications would be 100 in total and 105 for the applications
from Czech and Slovak students. Comparing this best guess to the actual number of
applications (140 in total and 21 for Czech and Slovak applications) and to predictions
of our markets (101-110 or 121-130 in total and 20-21 for Czech and Slovak applications)
suggests that our markets provided a more accurate prediction than this best guess.
Figure 8. Long-term (on the left) and short-term (on the right) prediction markets with VWAP and "Best guess".
Result 3: The sum of prices on the long-term market is greater than one.
In this section, we look at the sum of prices of all events. On the prediction market,
market prices can be interpreted as the probabilities of individual events. Therefore, the
prices of all possible events or outcomes should naturally add up to one. In general, the
eciency of the prediction market requires that the sum of all prices equals one. If this
5Alternatively, we could choose the average value of received applications, which would actually
work very well in the case of our long-term market. However, if we look at how much the number of
applications dier every year, we denitely should take the observed trend into account and not rely on
simple averages.
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is not the case, then arbitrage possibilities might exist and traders could gain risk-less
prot.
On our markets, traders were allowed to buy/sell any number of market portfolios
for the price of 1 Virtual Dollar. Should the sum of prices on the market be consistently
greater than one, traders could make a prot by buying market portfolios from a market
maker and selling the assets on the market. Similarly, if the sum of prices was consistently
lower than one, traders could make a prot by buying assets on the market and selling
market portfolios to a market maker.
We rst establish the fact that on our long-term prediction market the sum of prices
is greater than one. Then, we provide possible explanations for this fact, and at the end
of this section, we discuss the situation on our short-term prediction market. In the next
section (Observation 1), we explain why theoretical arbitrage possibilities could not be
exploited on our experimental markets. Our null-hypothesis is as follows:
H0: The sum of prices on the long-term market is equal to 1.
Based on the results of a t-test, we can reject this hypothesis at the 5% level of
signicance (with p-value equal to 0.011) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the
sum of prices is higher than one. To test this hypothesis, we use data from the rst 34
out of 35 periods. The reason for excluding the last period is the fact that only a very
limited number of trade orders were made, and market prices could not be determined
for six out of nine events.
We also used a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test and got qualitatively similar
results. The null-hypothesis can only be rejected at the 10% level of signicance, which is
most likely caused by a relatively small number of observations that we have. Moreover,
in some periods (9 out of 34), some of the assets were not traded, and therefore, their
price could not be determined. As a result, the sum of the prices did not include their
value and hence is understated.
The fact that the sum of prices is greater than one can be observed also from the
graph that follows. While the sum of prices was oscillating, during most periods, it was
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greater than one with a mean value equal to 1.15.
Figure 9. The sum of prices on our long-term prediction market during 34 periods: Mean value, which is equal to 1.15, is
depicted by the red horizontal line.
Now that we established the fact that the sum of prices on our long-term prediction
market was greater than one, we discuss a possible explanation of this phenomenon. We
think that this market ineciency was (at least partly) caused by the incentivization
scheme on our long-term prediction market. This market was organized in such a way
that only the three most successful traders earned prizes. In order to increase the chances
of prot, traders engaged in a strategy where they were trying to hold as many assets of
their favorite event as possible. This motivation pushed prices a little above their true
value, and as a result, the sum of all prices exceeded the value of one. This conjecture
could be experimentally tested by conducting two prediction markets, which would dier
only in the payment scheme. We leave this for further research.
To some extent, we can test this conjecture with the use of our short-term prediction
market. In the short-term market, traders were not endowed with any experimental
money, and they were not competing for a few big prizes. When using their own money,
traders were more motivated to trade assets for their true value. In the case of this short-
term market, the null-hypothesis that the sum of prices equals one cannot be rejected.
However, since our long-term and short-term prediction markets dier in many criteria,
we cannot draw any denite conclusions here.
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Result 4: Activity of traders does not aect their prot.
In this section, we test the hypothesis that more active traders earn higher prot. To
measure the level of traders' activity, we use a simple measure of the average number of
shares traded per period. We use traded shares instead of the number of limit orders
placed to avoid the potential problem with most active traders being those who place
many unreasonable orders.
In the short-term market, the dierence in activity across traders is rather negligible.
Therefore, we concentrate our attention on the long-term prediction market, where the
dierence in the activity of traders is more apparent. The average number of traded
shares per period across individual participants is depicted in the gure below. The
median value is 111. We divided all participants into two groups: more active traders
(with an average of traded shares above median) and less active traders (with an average
of traded shares below median value).
Figure 10. Average number of traded shares per trader and period. The median, which is equal to 111, is depicted by the
red horizontal line.
Our initial expectation was that more active traders should be more successful and
earn on average higher prot than those who only rarely take some action. However,
our analysis leads to the opposite result. The group of more active traders earned on
average 30% lower prot than the group of traders who were less active. This result is
not statistically signicant; nevertheless, we provide our explanation for this interesting
observation. Our null-hypothesis is as follows:
H0: The average earning of more active players is the same as the average earning of less
active traders.
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Based on the results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis
at 10% level of signicance. We conjecture that the reason for this result is as follows.
In our market, several traders chose an aggressive strategy. At the very beginning of the
market, these participants chose one or two events, and during the entire market, they
tried to buy as many shares of these assets as possible.
However, none of these chosen assets turned out to be a winning event. Therefore,
this group of the most active traders ended up with extremely low prots. On the other
hand, those participants, who were less active and held evenly distributed shares of each
event ended up with moderate earnings.
Only two faculty members actively participated on our market. Therefore we were not
able to analyze if students and faculty members behave dierently, or if faculty members
earned on average higher prots on the account of having supposedly more accurate
information about interest in the CERGE-EI Ph.D. program.
Observation 1: The sum of the prices was greater than one, but arbitrage
possibilities did not exist.
In some periods, prices summed to a number greater than one, which was the value of
the portfolio that consists of one contract for each event. We observed this phenomenon
mostly (though not exclusively) in the early periods of both markets probably due to the
fact that traders were just learning about the market value of contracts, and to make
sure that their orders would be matched, they placed very high buy orders.
In theory, this violated the no-arbitrage conditions. However, to take advantage of the
arbitrage conditions, individuals would need to know in advance that the prices will add
up to a number greater than one, and they would have to sell one piece of each asset in
order to exploit this opportunity. Since the prices were uctuating, this was very unlikely
to happen. Traders were placing limit orders without knowing what the market price will
be, and only after the period was closed, were orders matched and prices determined. In
theory, it could happen that a trader chose such limit orders that he would sell shares of
each event and make a prot. However, the oscillating sum of prices around the value of
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one clearly shows that this could not have been done systematically.
Moreover, should some traders try to prot on buying portfolios from market mak-
ers and selling them on the market, this would push prices down, and theoretical arbi-
trage opportunities would disappear. Thus, although violations of theoretical arbitrage
conditions were observed in the experiments, there were actually no practical arbitrage
opportunities.
Observation 2: Non-winning events were overpriced.
We look at the last week of trading on our long-term market and compare prices with
the actual number of received applications in a given period. In theory, prices of all
events corresponding to a lower number of applications than was received on a given day
(trading period) should be essentially zero. However, this is not what we observe in our
market.
To illustrate the situation on our market, we provide two graphs for periods 32 and
34 of the long-term market. The red vertical line corresponds to the actual number
of applications received on a particular day. If the prices on the market reect all the
information available to the traders, then the prices of all events to the left of the red
vertical line should be zero.
Figure 11. The distribution of prices on the long-term prediction market in period 32 on the left and in period 34 on the
right: The red vertical line depicts the actual number of received applications in a given period.
From the graphs it is clear that shares corresponding to events A, B, C, and especially
D are signicantly overpriced. A detailed inspection of the data of the individual buy
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orders shows that the most likely explanation is that traders did not try to get all the
information about the current number of received applications. This information was
available in the student oce (as well as the information about the applications received
for past years), but the numbers were not made public, traders had to ask for them.
Here the question of the optimal role of a market maker on small internal markets
arises. It seems that a market maker might want to encourage participants to gather all
possible pieces of information or maybe directly provide the necessary facts, especially, if
there is a reason to assume that not enough insiders would participate in the market.
We also analyzed our short-term prediction market designed to forecast the number
of applications from the CR and SR only. In this short-term prediction market we did
not experience the problem with overpriced securities corresponding to events that will
not occur for sure. As the number of received applications increased over time, the price
of shares tied to events A and B dropped, and eventually, these shares were not traded
at all because there were no buy orders placed.
Figure 12. The distribution of prices on the short-term prediction market in periods 7-8 on the left and in periods 9-10 on
the right: The red vertical line depicts the actual number of received applications in a given period.
Observation 3: Learning was faster in our short-term market.
In this section, we look closely at the last few trading days on both markets. As we
discussed in Observation 2, non-winning events were overpriced. In other words, during
certain periods towards the end of the market, subjects were buying events that were tied
to a rather low number of applications, while the actual number of received applications
was already higher during that time.
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Long-term prediction market
Events corresponding to the low number of applications were overpriced in our long-
term market. We think that this happened because of two reasons. First, the information
about the actual number of applications got to traders slowly. This information was not
publicly available, traders had to contact our student oce to get this information, so
obtaining the information was costly.
The second reason appears to be the incentivization scheme on our long-term market.
As we already have mentioned, only the three most successful traders were awarded with
a prize, other participants got nothing. Therefore, to have a chance of winning some
prize, traders used their a priori beliefs to identify the most likely outcome, and they
were placing buy orders on the corresponding security from the beginning of the market.
As the number of received application kept increasing, it was a sign that events A, B,
C, and D are unlikely to occur. But traders who concentrated on buying corresponding
securities already invested almost all of their money into these securities, and it was too
late to change their strategy. Hence, these traders ignored the signals about the increasing
number of applications, and the prices of these events were higher than their objective
probabilities. Only after it was clear that the number of received applications exceeded
the numbers corresponding to events A, B, C and D, did our subjects slowly stop placing
orders on these events.
To support this argument, we look at those traders, who concentrated on buying
shares of securities tied to a low number of applications. In particular, we analyzed the
behavior of traders buying shares of events A-D. There were 9 such traders. They can
easily be identied because, on average, these traders held over 2000 shares of one or two
events A-D and on average less than 200 shares of all other events.
These traders were very active during the experiment until the last few periods. They
were placing high-volume buy orders on events A-D until period 32, when it became clear
that these events will not be winning. In period 33, suddenly half of these traders stopped
placing orders completely. However, they were still active on the short-term prediction
market. This clearly shows that these traders hoped for a low number of applications
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until the very last moment and kept the prices of corresponding events high despite all
signals suggesting that the number of applications would be much higher.
Those 5 traders who kept placing buy orders on events A-D even after period 33 were
most likely not aware of the current number of received applications. Due to these few
traders, market prices were kept relatively high until the very end of the market.
Short-term prediction market
Our short-term prediction market was much more exible, and the signals about
the increasing number of received applications were reected in prices much faster. In
this market, traders were not competing against each other in a tournament. Payos
were determined based on the value of the portfolio held after the market was closed.
Therefore, all individuals were trying to increase the number of the securities tied to
the most likely event. This simply means that immediately after receiving the signal
about the increasing number of received applications, traders updated their beliefs and
concentrated on obtaining assets corresponding to the higher numbers of applications.
This observation suggests that the system of incentives has a signicant impact on
how fast the new pieces of information get to the market through traders' actions. For the
reasons mentioned above, there are no signicant trends in the sequences of predictions
in the case of our long-term market. In other words, the distribution of prices does not
change signicantly during the last days even though new information was available every
day. In the case of our short-term market, we observe a trend in prices that is consistent
with the expectations of the future increase of the number of applications.
Observation 4: The number of buy oers exceeded the number of sell oers.
Our result is opposite to that of Chen and Plott (2002), where the authors report that
the number of sell oers exceeded the number of buy oers. On our markets, the majority
of placed orders were reasonable. Orders to buy at the price equal to zero or close to zero
and orders to sell for a price equal or close to one account for only approximately 5% of
all placed orders.
In our long-term market, the number of buy oers is higher than the number of sell
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oers. We suggest that this result is caused by the tournament incentive scheme in our
market (as opposed to the standard reward structure employed in Chen and Plott 2002).
As we discussed before in the section on the design of our market, if only the most
successful traders get a prize, they are highly motivated to buy as many shares of the
most likely events as possible. This claim accords with evidence presented in James and
Isaac (2000), where the authors show that in tournament, traders often employ a risky,
all-or-nothing strategy.
Traders in our market were trying to sell all shares of events which they considered
not likely to win and tried to buy the highest possible amount of their favorites. There
were 9 events in our long-term prediction market, and traders were endowed with cash
and 200 portfolios. Even if a trader sells all of her shares of non-winning events, she only
sells up to 1600 shares (8 events not likely to win with 200 shares of each). The number
of shares of a favorite event6 was signicantly higher than that for the majority of active
traders (around 2500-3000 shares). This fact sheds light on why we observe more buy
than sell orders on our market. We observe similar behavior on our short-term market.
However, here the dierence between the number of buy and sell oers is very small.
Observation 5: The success of the internal prediction market appears to be
dependent on the nature of the institution and the market itself.
Compared to internal prediction markets running within corporate businesses such as
Hewlett-Packard, Siemens and others, our long-term prediction market was less successful
in predicting the outcome of our interest. In this particular case, a poll, where the
individuals with the most accurate guesses get a prize, might be a faster, simpler and
probably equally precise way to gather the dispersed pieces of information. On the other
hand, the short-term prediction market with dierent implementation features worked
very well and identied the winning event successfully.
6Most traders were investing into buying shares for one or two events.
69
Observation 6: The incentive scheme in our long-term internal prediction
market might have hindered the process of information aggregation.
The ability of the prediction market to form an accurate prediction is based on the
process of learning about other people's beliefs by observing their actions. In other words,
individuals enter the market with their subjective beliefs and over the time, they update
these beliefs based on observing the behavior on the market.
In our long-term market, only three of the most successful traders got a prize. Hence,
our incentive scheme supported the type of behavior, where the traders bet all the money
on their a priori black horse and stick to this event in order to buy as many underlying
assets as possible. Even if they later observed that other traders concentrated on dierent
events, it is usually too late to switch to a dierent event, and hence, the learning process
is not reected in the prices.
3.5 Optimal Market Design
In this section, we discuss the necessary conditions for an internal small-scale prediction
market to work well. Our ndings are based on the existing prediction market literature
and our experience from the CERGE-EI internal prediction market.
• Payment scheme: Participants with relevant information have to be motivated to
trade actively based on their information. This requires an appropriate payment
scheme. Our experimental market suggests that the information is more likely to
be aggregated if all traders are paid a "small" prot according to their performance
(buying for low and selling for a high price or buying the winning events cheaply)
compared to the system in which only a few of the most successful traders get the
"big" prize.
The performance of an internal prediction market also seems to be better if partic-
ipants are required to (at least partly) invest their own money. Our results accord
with those cited in James and Isaac (2000). James and Isaac (2000) argue that a
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tournament can cause distorted market performance and divergence from intrinsic
value pricing.
• Market design: A proper payo system discussed in the previous paragraph also
helps to minimize the problem with insucient liquidity that is common for small
scale markets.
• Real vs experimental money: Using real money seems to have two eects. First,
participants are more careful when making trading decisions (less risky behavior,
we observe more diversication in trading), and traders have stronger incentives
to participate actively in the market. Another advantage is that more informed
traders are attracted to the market if they can lose their own money, and hence,
there would be more information present in the system.
• The frequency of market clearing: The frequency of market clearing has to be
chosen with respect to the duration of the market. The shorter the market the more
frequent the market clearing should be. The reason is that sometimes the start of
the market is slow. It might be the case that there is only a little information
available at the beginning of the market, and traders need a few rounds to learn
about other traders' beliefs.
• The open question remains  what is the optimal number of participants or the
optimal information size relative to the market that might be required for eective
information aggregation to take place? In particular, we do not want to miss a
person with much relevant information; but on the other hand, we do not want to
include too many participants without any substantial information.
3.6 Prediction Market Counterfactuals
In this section, we try to analyze what would happen if our prediction market was or-
ganized as a betting system. In light of the key characteristics of both prediction and
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betting markets, a prediction market seems to be the proper choice of the market mecha-
nism in this setting. We were able to provide sucient support to all traders, and hence,
the complexity of the prediction market was not an issue.
Should our internal prediction market for applications be organized as a betting sys-
tem, we would denitely observe a signicant proportion of late trading. Participants
would have strong incentives to try and extract as much information as possible before
they place their bets. As a result, no information would be aggregated in the early stages
of the market, and the predictions would likely be much less accurate. Even if early bets
were placed, the betting system is much more rigid compared to a prediction market, and
therefore traders would not be able to translate their updated private beliefs into market
prices (market odds) so promptly.
On the other hand, a betting market environment would most likely eliminate the
problem of trading shares of not-winning events. In theory, the prices of all shares cor-
responding to a lower number of applications than was received on a given day (trading
period) should be essentially zero. However, in our market, we observed that a signicant
amount of these shares were traded. As a result, the prices of these shares were much
higher than their real value.
We already discussed that most likely this phenomenon is caused by traders not
getting the new information about the number of received applications. Another reason
could be the existence of a market portfolio. A market portfolio consists of one share for
each of the nine events. If traders needed cash, they had the option of selling one or more
market portfolios to the market administrator at any point. To be able to do so, traders
needed to hold one share of each event. If traders lacked some shares of not-winning
events, they needed to buy them (for low but non-zero prices) for this purpose. As a
result, the market prices of shares tied to not-winning events were too high. Then, the
whole (normalized) distribution of prices (interpreted as probabilities) of the events is
rather at compared to the distribution that we would get on a betting market (with the
same traders and their private information).
Overall, we think that the prediction market was an appropriate choice as the predic-
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tion mechanism in our setting. More general, prediction markets seem more appropriate
in small-scale internal settings.
3.7 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to take a well-known and experimentally tested information
aggregation mechanism and implement it in a real institution for internal use to examine
if it could work in this particular setting. The mechanism of our choice was the set of
markets for several securities each of which was tied to a subset of possible outcomes.
In particular, we conducted internal experimental prediction markets at CERGE-EI,
Prague, to forecast the number of applications received for the 2009/2010 Ph.D. program.
The hope was to establish the prediction market as a leading indicator of the recruitment
process that potentially could aect activities in the weeks leading up to the deadline
and the ensuing selection process.
Numerous potential drawbacks appeared during our experimental markets: for exam-
ple, a low number of participants (especially in our short-term prediction market) or a
low level of activity (many participants traded only occasionally). We tried two dierent
payment schemes and concluded that using one's own money discourages some potential
traders. On the other hand, those who did participate were more careful about trading
and followed the market more closely, and hence, there was a higher potential for accu-
rate predictions.These are all issues which are not a problem in the case of laboratory
experiments but become crucial within institution settings.
Overall, the results of this project show promise. We show that for the performance
of the market, design and implementation details matter greatly, especially in the case of
internal small scale prediction markets. We discuss optimal market design and conclude
that a properly designed market has the strong potential to serve as a prediction and
internal decision making tool.
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3.8 Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the full set of instructions received by our traders. All traders
had continuous access to this set of instructions during the entire time of the experiment.
We include the instructions in this chapter in order to provide all important details of our
market concerning, for example, the type of information available to traders, the type of
actions that traders could take, the resolution of ties etc.
INSTRUCTIONS - INTRODUCTION
When you log in to the market you will receive a cash balance of $200 and 200 market
portfolios (i.e. 200 shares of each event). You will have access to all the information about
your current share holdings, amount of cash, and the number of portfolios that you own,
and you will be able to place orders to buy/sell individual shares/market portfolios.
You will also have access to detailed information about previous rounds (orders that
you placed, trades that were realized, past market prices, etc.) The information will be
available in the following form.
Current Round is the number of the round you are playing at the moment, and there
will be 37 rounds or trading days (January 21  February 26, 2010).
Wealth is your cash (200 at the beginning). You can increase your cash by selling market
portfolios or shares. If you place some buy orders and they are realized, your cash will
decrease by the cost of all realized orders.
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Disposable Wealth is Wealth minus the value of all the buy orders that you place. You
can keep placing Buy orders as long as your Disposable Wealth stays positive.
Shares of Event "X" is the number of shares of Event X that you currently hold. If
you start with 100 shares of Event "X", and you place an order to Sell 10 shares of Event
"X", this number will decrease to 90. But if this order is not realized during market
clearing, the number of shares of Event "X" will be 100 in the next round.
Portfolios is the number of market portfolios you currently hold.
HOW TO BUY/SELL MARKET PORTFOLIOS
Purchasing a Market Portfolio: When you have a cash balance of at least $1, you have
the option of purchasing one or more market portfolios from the market administrator.
Each market portfolio costs $1, and it consists of one share associated with each outcome:
1 share of Event A, 1 share of Event B, ... , 1 share of Event I. The value of this portfolio
is exactly $1, since there will be exactly one observed event ("winner"), so one share in
the market portfolio will pay $1 and the remaining shares will pay $0. If you purchase 1
market portfolio, your cash balance will decrease by $1.
Selling a Market Portfolio: When you have share holdings of at least 1 share of
each event, you have the option of selling one or more market portfolios to the market
administrator. Each market portfolio costs $1 so each sold portfolio will bring you $1 in
cash.
You can buy/sell Market Portfolios by choosing "Type" (Buy or Sell) and "Quantity"
and conrming your order by clicking the button "Submit". In the gure above, you
can see the order to Sell 10 Market Portfolios. After clicking the "Submit" button, the
number of your Market Portfolios will immediately decrease by 10, and Wealth as well
as Disposable Wealth will increase by 10.
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HOW TO BUY/SELL SHARES
If you have enough cash (Disposable Wealth) you can place an order to buy shares.
Similarly if you hold enough shares you can place an order to sell them. When placing
an order you choose: "Event" (A-I), "Type" (Buy or Sell), "Quantity" (how many shares
you want to buy or sell), and "Limit Price". If you place an order to buy, the Limit
Price determines the maximum price that you are willing to pay for that share(s). If
you place an order to sell, the Limit Price determines the minimum price that you are
willing to accept for that share(s). In the picture below, you can see an order to buy 30
shares of Event "A" for at most $0.35.
If you click the "Submit" button your oer will be recorded and you will see all your
orders in the current round in the table called "List of current trading orders".
If you want to cancel one of the orders, just click on the "Delete it!" button, and your
order will be deleted.
Note: The Quantity of an order is limited to 50. If, for example, you want to buy 65
shares of event A, you can do it by placing two orders (e.g. one for 50 and the other for
15 shares).
HOW ARE PRICES SET (MARKET CLEARING)
Rounds (Trading Days): Each day, at 3 a.m. all orders to buy and sell shares for
a particular event will be matched up to determine the trades and associated trading
prices for shares. (All orders from your List of current trading orders will be taken into
account.) This process is calledmarket clearing, and the resulting price at which shares
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are bought or sold is called the market clearing price.
Arranging Trades: Trades are possible if some of the sell order prices are below some
of the buy order prices. The market maker is a computer program that will organize the
buy and sell orders and use these to determine a market clearing price. Trades will NOT
be arranged for ask prices that are above this level and bid prices that are below this
level.
Market Clearing: All transactions will be done at the same market clearing price.
This will generally be a price at which the number of shares that traders wish to buy
is equal to the number of shares that traders wish to sell. In other words, the number
of shares with limit sell prices at or below this clearing price is equal to the number of
shares with limit buy prices at or above this clearing price. Thus, those who are willing
to pay the most will buy from those who are willing to sell for the least, but all trades
will be at the same price.
Clearing Prices: The bids and asks for each of the 9 types of shares will be used to
determine the market clearing price for that type of share. Thus, there will be 9 clearing
prices determined each time the market is cleared. All shares of a particular type that
are bought and sold when the market clears will be bought and sold at the same price,
i.e. at the clearing price for that type of share.
Resolution of Ties: In some cases, it may not be possible to exactly equalize the
numbers of units demanded and oered. For example, if there is one limit order to
purchase a single share at 2 cents, and if there are 2 limit orders to sell, each for a single
share at 2 cents, then the market clearing price would be 2, but one of the two sell orders
cannot be executed. The decision of which order to execute in the event of a tie will be
based on a random process, i.e. the computer equivalent of the ip of a fair coin.
Examples of Clearing Price Determination:
Example 1
Trader 1: sell 10 shares of Event A for at least $0.5 Trader 2: buy 5 shares of Event A
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for at most $0.6 Trader 3: buy 5 shares of Event A for at most $0.7 The resulting price
will be $0.55, and 10 shares will be sold.
Example 2
Trader 1: sell 10 shares of Event A for at least $0.5 Trader 2: buy 5 shares of Event A
for at most $0.6 Trader 3: buy 3 shares of Event A for at most $0.7 The resulting price
will be $0.5, and 8 shares will be sold.
Example 3
Trader 1: sell 8 shares of Event A for at least $0.5 Trader 2: buy 5 shares of Event A for
at most $0.6 Trader 3: buy 5 shares of Event A for at most $0.7 The resulting price will
be $0.6, and 8 shares will be sold.
Note that in all three examples the market clearing price can be anything between 0.5
and 0.6. For all prices from this interval the same amount of shares will be sold.
The rules for determining the exact price are as follows:
If the volume of demand (buy) and supply (sell) is the same, then the market clearing
price is in the middle of this interval (0.55 in Example 1 ).
If the volume of demand (buy) is smaller than the volume of supply (sell), then the
market maker chooses the price from the interval, that is the most favorable for buyers,
and the least favorable for the sellers ($0.5 in Example 2 ).
If the volume of demand (buy) is larger than the volume of supply (sell), then the market
maker chooses the price from the interval that is the most favorable for the seller and the
least favorable for the buyers ($0.6 in Example 3 ).
History: You will have access to a full history of your actions all the time. At the bottom
of the trading page, you can nd the button "History of Prices and Trades". If you click
on this button, you will be redirected to a page with the history of all the clearing prices
for all past rounds. Also, you can review all the orders that you placed in past rounds,
and you will see if they were realized or not.
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